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Non{technical Summary
Wage inequality has been increasing in many industrialized countries over the past
decades. Parallel to this trend, coverage by collective wage bargaining has declined
strongly in many economies (OECD, 2004). The gender wage gap has also declined
in most of these countries. However, these three developments have rarely been investi-
gated jointly in a systematic way. This paper therefore investigates the link between the
recent increase in wage inequality between 2001 and 2006, the decline in collective wage
bargaining, and the development of the gender wage gap using linked-employer-employee
data for West Germany. Applying a sequential decomposition approach, we analyze the
importance of rm-specic and personal-specic variables as well as of collective bargain-
ing for changes in wage inequality. We address the following questions: What are the
gender dierences in the increase in wage inequality? What is the impact of the decline of
union coverage on the evolution of the wage distribution? Has wage inequality increased
within bargaining regimes? What is the impact of rm-level variables and personal char-
acteristics on wage inequality?
This is the rst study to use the two cross-sections of the large German Structure
of Earnings Survey in 2001 and 2006 for an analysis of the increase in wage inequality.
In a quantile regression framework, we analyze wage changes by gender and the gender
wage gap over the entire wage distribution. Building upon Machado and Mata (2005) and
Melly (2005), we propose a sequential decomposition, which takes account of the observed
joint sample distribution of the covariates.
The German institutional background is as follows: Traditionally, wages are deter-
mined by collective bargaining between unions and employers' associations at the indus-
try level (sectoral collective contract or \Flachentarifvertrag"). Bargaining at the rm or
plant level (\Firmentarifvertrag" or \Betriebsvereinbarung") exists as well but covers a
much smaller share of employees and rms. The recent decline in collective bargaining
coverage is in line with international trends.
Our results show that wage inequality is rising strongly both for males and females,
driven not only by wage increases at the top of the distribution, but even more so by
real wage losses below the median. At the same time, we nd a sharp decline in cov-
erage by collective bargaining. Both coverage by sectoral-level bargaining and coverage
by rm-level bargaining is falling over time. Our sequential decomposition results show
that all workplace related eects (rm eects and bargaining eects) contribute to the
strong rise in wage inequality. We nd evidence that the reduction in bargaining cov-
erage contributes in a sizeable way to rising wage inequality and that the bargaining
outcomes allow for higher wage exibility. Nevertheless, these eects are dominated by
the rm coecients eect, which is almost exclusively driven by the sector coecients
eect, meaning that between- and within-industry wage dierences drive the observed
rise in wage inequality. The drop in collective bargaining coverage takes place almost
exclusively within sectors. In addition, personal coecients contribute to some degree to
the increase in wage inequality, again reinforcing the dominance of labor demand eects.
In contrast, personal characteristics change in a way to reduce wage inequality. All this
adds up to a stagnation of the overall gender wage gap, and only the strong improvement
in personal characteristics of females results in a fall of the gender wage gap at the bottom
of the wage distribution. The drop in collective bargaining coverage hardly aected the
gender wage gap.
Das Wichtigste in Kurze
Die Lohnungleichheit ist in vielen Industrielandern wahrend der letzten Jahrzehnte
angestiegen. Parallel zu diesem Trend hat die Tarifbindung in vielen Landern stark
abgenommen (OECD, 2004). Das geschlechtsspezische Lohndierenzial ist in den meis-
ten Landern zuruckgegangen. Diese drei Entwicklungen wurden bisher nur selten im
Zusammenhang analysiert. Deshalb untersucht diese Studie den Zusammenhang zwischen
dem Anstieg der Lohnungleichheit zwischen 2001 und 2006, dem Ruckgang der Tarif-
bindung, und der Entwicklung des geschlechtsspezischen Lohndierenzials auf Basis von
verknupften Arbeitgeber-Arbeitnehmer-Daten. Unter Verwendung einer sequenziellen
Zerlegungstechnik analysieren wir die Bedeutung von rmenspezischen und personlichen
Merkmalen sowie der Tarifbindung fur die Entwicklung der Lohnungleichheit. Wir un-
tersuchen die folgenden Fragen: Was sind die Unterschiede im Anstieg der Lohnungleich-
heit nach Geschlechtern? Welchen Einuss hat der Ruckgang der Tarifbindung auf die
Lohnverteilung? Hat die Lohnungleichheit innerhalb der verschiedenen Lohnverhand-
lungsregime zugenommen? Was ist der Einuss von rmenspezischen Variablen und
personlichen Merkmalen auf die Lohnungleichheit?
Dies ist die erste Studie, die gleichzeitig die beiden Querschnitte der Gehalts- und
Lohnstrukturerhebung 2001 und der Verdienststrukturerhebung 2006 fur eine Analyse
des Anstiegs der Lohnungleichheit verwendet. Wir schatzen Quantilsregressionen, um die
geschlechtsspezische Lohnentwicklung uber die gesamte Lohnverteilung zu untersuchen.
Auf Basis von Machado und Mata (2005) und Melly (2005) schlagen wir eine sequenzielle
Zerlegung vor, die die beobachtete gemeinsame Verteilung der Kovariate berucksichtigt.
Traditionell werden Lohne in Deutschland uber Lohnverhandlungen zwischen Gewerk-
schaften und Arbeitgeberverbanden auf der Branchenebene (\Flachentarifvertrag") bes-
timmt. Es gibt auch Lohnverhandlungen auf der Firmenebene (\Firmentarifvertrag"
oder \Betriebsvereinbarung"), aber diese betreen nur einen deutlich kleineren Teil der
Beschaftigten und der Firmen. Die aktuellen Entwicklungen in Deutschland entsprechen
dem internationalen Trend.
Unsere Ergebnisse zeigen, dass die Lohnungleichheit sowohl fur Manner als auch fur
Frauen stark angestiegen ist. Dieser Anstieg speist sich sowohl aus den Reallohngewin-
nen im oberen Bereich der Lohnverteilung als auch aus den Reallohnverlusten unterhalb
des Medians. Gleichzeitig nden wir einen starken Ruckgang der Tarifbindung. Sowohl
die Tarifbindung durch einen Flachentarifvertrag als auch die Tarifbindung durch einen
Haustarifvertrag geht im Zeitverlauf zuruck. Unsere sequenzielle Zerlegung zeigt, dass
alle Arbeitsplatzeekte (Firmeneekte, Tarifbindung) einen Anteil am Anstieg der Lohn-
ungleichheit haben. Der Ruckgang der Tarifbindung tragt zu einem bedeutenden Teil
zu dem Anstieg der Lohnungleichheit bei. Gleichzeitig steigt auch die Lohnungleichheit
innerhalb der Lohnverhandlungsregime. Gleichwohl werden diese Tarifbindungseekte
durch die Veranderungen der rmenspezischen Koezienten dominiert, wobei letztere
nahezu ausschlielich durch die Branchenkoezienten getrieben sind. Die Veranderung
der Lohnunterschiede zwischen und innerhalb von Branchen erklart zu einem groen Teil
den beobachteten Anstieg der Lohnungleichheit. Der Ruckgang in der Tarifbindung ndet
nahezu ausschlielich innerhalb der Branchen statt. Weiterhin tragen personliche Koef-
zienten etwas zu dem Anstieg der Lohnungleichheit bei. Im Gegensatz dazu hatten die
Veranderungen der personlichen Charakteristika zu einem Ruckgang der Lohnungleichheit
gefuhrt. Insgesamt beobachten wir eine Stagnation des gesamten geschlechtsspezischen
Lohndierenzials. Die starke Verbesserung der personlichen Charakteristika der Frauen
erklart den Ruckgang des geschlechtsspezischen Lohndierenzials im unteren Bereich
der Lohnverteilung. Dagegen tragt der Ruckgang der Tarifbindung fast gar nicht zur
Entwicklung des geschlechtsspezischen Lohndierenzials bei.
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1 Introduction
Wage inequality has been increasing in many industrialized countries over the past decades.
Parallel to this trend, coverage by collective wage bargaining has declined strongly in
many economies (OECD, 2004). The gender wage gap has also declined in most of these
countries. However, these three developments have rarely been investigated jointly in a
systematic way. This paper therefore investigates the link between the recent increase in
wage inequality between 2001 and 2006, the decline in collective wage bargaining, and
the development of the gender wage gap using linked-employer-employee data for West
Germany. Applying a sequential decomposition analysis, we analyze the importance of
rm-specic and personal-specic variables as well as of collective bargaining for changes
in wage inequality. There exists a vast literature concerning all three of the mentioned
developments separately. Without being able to provide a comprehensive summary of
this literature, we discuss some selected references for these trends.
First, wage inequality has been rising in Germany during the last 25 years (Kohn, 2006;
Gernandt and Pfeier, 2007; Dustmann et al., 2009; Antonczyk et al., 2009). However,
compared to the strong increases in wage inequality in the US and the UK since the early
1980s, the increase in wage dispersion in Germany was restricted to the top of the wage
distribution in the 1980s while wage inequality at the bottom of the wage distribution
only started to grow in the mid 1990s (Fitzenberger, 1999; Dustmann et al., 2009). The
long-term development towards higher inequality at the bottom of the wage distribution
started in Germany about one and a half decades later than in the US. It has frequently
been argued that labor market institutions such as unions and minimum wages prevented
an increase in wage inequality at the bottom of the wage distribution before the mid
1990s (Fitzenberger, 1999; Fitzenberger et al., 2008; Dustmann et al., 2009). In addition,
Antonczyk et al. (2009) show that the recent increase of wage dispersion among German
male workers cannot be explained by changes in tasks performed at the workplace. This
result suggests to analyze the importance of institutions.
Second, coverage by collective wage bargaining (i.e. union wage contracts) in West
Germany plummeted between 2001 and 2006 by 16.5 percentage points (pp) for male
workers and by 19.1 pp for female workers as reported in the German Structure of Earn-
ings Survey (see section 5). Union membership of male employees also dropped sharply
in the past decades in Germany, whereas that of female employees has been more stable {
albeit at a much lower level (Card et al., 2003; Schnabel, 2005, p.185; Kohn and Lembcke,
2007). Since collective bargaining is typically associated with wage compression (Fitzen-
berger et al., 2008; Burda et al., 2008), the weakening of collective bargaining is likely to
contribute to the increase in wage inequality.1 For the US about 20% of the increase in
1For an international perspective, see Card (2001); Card et al. (2003); Addison et al. (2007); de la
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wage inequality can be attributed to deunionization (Card, 2001; Addison et al., 2007).
For Germany, Dustmann et al. (2009) estimate that about 28% of the increase in lower
tail inequality (measured by dierence between 50% and 15% quantile of log wages) is due
to the decline in union coverage compared to only 11% at the top of the distribution (85%
minus 50% quantile).2 Again considering the US, Card (2001) shows that characteristics
as well as the returns to those characteristics are compressed under collective bargaining.3
However, the latter eect is smaller for women.
Third, the gender wage gap has been falling in most industrialized countries over the
past decades (Blau and Kahn, 1996, 2000; Arulampalam et al., 2007), including Germany
(Lauer, 2000; Fitzenberger and Wunderlich, 2002; Sohr and Stephan, 2005; Antonczyk,
2007; Black and Spitz-Oener, 2007). Nevertheless, women still earn about 20% less than
men at the median. Blau and Kahn (1997) and Black and Spitz-Oener (2007) conclude
that skill-biased technological change has worked in favor of women, contributing to the
decline of the gender wage gap. A number of recent studies analyze the gender wage
gap along the entire distribution and nd an increase over the distribution (the so-called
\glass-ceiling", see Arulampalam et al., 2007; de la Rica et al., 2008; Albrecht et al.,
2003). Furthermore, some studies report an enlarged gender wage gap at the bottom of
the wage distribution (Arulampalam et al., 2007; Fitzenberger and Wunderlich, 2002), in
particular for low-skilled women.4 Notwithstanding, Antonczyk (2007), Black and Spitz-
Oener (2007), and Gartner and Hinz (2009) observe a stagnation of the decline of the
gender wage gap in Germany over the last years and the reasons being this stagnation
remain an open question.
Despite the high relevance of these three developments, only a small literature inves-
tigates them jointly in a systematic way. For the US and Canada, several studies suggest
that deunionization aects men more strongly than women, thereby contributing to the
closing of the gender wage gap (DiNardo et al., 1996; Fortin and Lemieux, 1997; Blau and
Rica et al. (2008); Fortin and Lemieux (1997); DiNardo et al. (1996), and for Germany: Fitzenberger
(1999); Gerlach and Stephan (2006); Fitzenberger and Kohn (2005); Kohn and Lembcke (2007).
2The results by Dustmann et al. (2009) are based on linked employer-employee data (LIAB). These
data link the establishment panel survey of the IAB and individual earnings information from social
security records. The coverage information is self reported by the rm which may be subject to measure-
ment error. Using the reweighting approach of DiNardo et al. (1996), Dustmann et al. (2009) calculate
the counterfactual earnings distribution holding union coverage rates constant between 1995 and 2004.
The dierence between the implied counterfactual changes in earnings inequality and the actual change in
earnings inequality is attributed to the decline in union coverage. The reweighting approach implemented
by Dustmann et al. (2009, section 4.1) does not distinguish between changes in other covariates, which
are correlated with the decline in union coverage, and the ceteris paribus eect of the decline in union
coverage. This is something our decomposition approach described below accounts for. Anticipating our
empirical results, the total union coverage eect tends to be somewhat larger than the partial coverage
eect.
3See Fitzenberger and Kohn (2005) for evidence on Germany.
4Analogous to \glass-ceiling", this phenomenon is frequently referred to as \glass oor" (see e.g. de la
Rica et al., 2008) or \sticky oor" (see e.g. Drolet and Mumford, 2009).
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Kahn, 1997; Doiron and Riddell, 1994). Edin and Richardson (2002) document that wage
compression as implied by unions reduces within-industry wage dierences. However,
considering the case of Sweden, this comes along with higher between-industry dierences
which in turn partly counteract the closing of the gender wage gap. Meng and Meurs
(2004) analyze France and Australia and argue, based on a decomposition analysis, that
rms in both countries use their scope in wage setting as a mean to reduce the gender
wage dierential. This scope is higher in a less centralized system like in Australia; conse-
quently, countries with stronger institutions like France display higher gender wage gaps.
For Germany, Heinze and Wolf (2006) and Gartner and Stephan (2009, 2004) nd that
the gender wage gap is lower within rms compared to the overall wage dierential {
suggesting a certain degree of homogeneity of workers within a rm. At the same time,
the existence of a works council or coverage by collective wage bargaining agreements
reduces the gender wage gap.
To the best of our knowledge, only one study is rather close to ours: Felgueroso et al.
(2008) analyze the gender wage gap and its link to collective bargaining along the entire
distribution for Spain. Centralized collective wage bargaining shows an increasing gender
wage gap over the wage distribution. This is because more centralized wage bargaining
(unions) exerts less control regarding the positive gap between actual wages and negotiated
wages (\wage cushion") and regarding bonus payments. In contrast, when collective wage
bargaining takes place at the rm level, unions have a stronger control on actual wages,
which in turn explains why the gender wage gap does not increase over the distribution. In
contrast to our study, Felgueroso et al. (2008) do not separate rm-specic from personal-
specic eects in a detailed sequential decomposition analysis.
The present study describes the gender specic changes in wage inequality for Ger-
many. We address the following questions: What are the gender dierences in the increase
in wage inequality? What is the impact of the decline of union coverage on the evolution
of the wage distribution? Has wage inequality increased within bargaining regimes? What
is the impact of rm-level variables and personal characteristics on wage inequality?
This is the rst study to use the two cross-sections of the large German Structure
of Earnings Survey in 2001 and 2006 for an analysis of the increase in wage inequality.
In a quantile regression framework, we analyze wage changes by gender and the gender
wage gap over the entire wage distribution and we employ a decomposition technique
building upon Machado and Mata (2005) and Melly (2005). We distinguish between
personal characteristics, rm characteristics, and the bargaining regime in a sequential
decomposition. Analogous to the recent study by Chernozhukov et al. (2008), we dene
the dierent eects on changes of the wage structure as dierences between clearly dened
counterfactual wage distributions. Our sequential decomposition takes account of the
observed joint sample distribution of the covariates.
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Traditionally in Germany, wages are determined by collective bargaining between
unions and employers' associations at the industry level (sectoral collective contract or
\Flachentarifvertrag"). Bargaining at the rm or plant level (\Firmentarifvertrag" or
\Betriebsvereinbarung") exists as well but covers a much smaller share of employees and
rms. Discrimination against non-union-members is legally forbidden, thus all employees
in a rm recognizing a bargaining contract { and not only union members in this rm {
benet from the outcome of the collective agreements. Moreover, a rm may recognize a
bargaining contract without being legally required to do so. This implies that coverage
by wage bargaining is much higher than union density among employees (Fitzenberger
et al., 2010).
Our results show that wage inequality is rising strongly both for males and females,
driven not only by wage increases at the top of the distribution, but even more so by real
wage losses below the median. At the same time, we nd a sharp decline in coverage by
collective bargaining. Both coverage by sectoral-level bargaining and coverage by rm-
level bargaining is falling over time. Our sequential decomposition results show that all
workplace related eects (rm eects and bargaining eects) contribute to the strong rise
in wage inequality. We nd evidence that the reduction in bargaining coverage contributes
in a sizeable way to rising wage inequality and that the bargaining outcomes allow for
higher wage exibility. Nevertheless, these eects are dominated by the rm coecients
eect, which is almost exclusively driven by the sector coecients eect, meaning that
between- and within-industry wage dierences drive the observed rise in wage inequality.
The drop in collective bargaining coverage takes place almost exclusively within sectors
but hardly contributes to the observed wage changes. In addition, personal coecients
contribute to some degree to the increase in wage inequality, again reinforcing the dom-
inance of labor demand eects. In contrast, personal characteristics change in a way to
reduce wage inequality. All this adds up to a very small change in the overall gender wage
gap, and only the strong improvement in personal characteristics of females results in a
fall of the gender wage gap at the bottom of the wage distribution.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: The next section reviews the
economic background of our analysis. Section 3 describes the data and presents rst
descriptive results. In section 4, the sequential decomposition technique based on quantile
regression is explained before presenting the corresponding empirical results in section 5.
Finally, section 6 provides some concluding remarks. The appendix contains further
information on the data and detailed estimation results including a robustness check of
those.
4
2 Economic background
This section describes the recent development of wage inequality and discusses the link
between union coverage and the gender wage gap. Skill-biased technical change (SBTC)
is the most prominent explanation for the increase in wage inequality since the 1980s in
the US and other industrialized countries. It results in an increasing demand for more
highly skilled labor (see the survey by Katz and Autor, 1999) under the assumption
that the increase in demand is stronger than the parallel increase in the supply of more
highly skilled labor. The simple SBTC hypothesis predicts rising wage inequality over
the entire wage distribution. This is consistent with the evidence for the US for the
1980s but not for the 1990s (Katz and Autor, 1999; Autor et al., 2008) as during the
later decade inequality stopped to grow at the bottom of the wage distribution. For
West Germany, Dustmann et al. (2009) show that wage inequality began to rise at the
top of the wage distribution during the 1980s (see also Fitzenberger, 1999) whereas wage
inequality at the bottom of the wage distribution only started to increase during the
1990s. These developments in Germany for the 1980s are consistent with the SBTC
hypothesis (Fitzenberger, 1999; Dustmann et al., 2009), if one allows for the possibility
that growing wage inequality at the bottom of the wage distribution is prevented by
labor market institutions such as unions and minimum wages as implied by the welfare
state. In a similar vein, DiNardo et al. (1996) and Fortin and Lemieux (1997) argue
for the US that increasing wage inequality in the 1980s and the early 1990s may partly
be explained by changing labor market institutions, i.e. falling real minimum wages and
deunionization. Card (2001) and Addison et al. (2007) nd that about 20% of the increase
in wage inequality in the US can be attributed to deunionization. For West Germany,
Dustmann et al. (2009) nd that among male workers about 28% of the increase in lower
tail inequality between 1995 and 2004 is associated with the decline in bargaining coverage
compared to only 11% at the top of the distribution. The authors use linked employer-
employee data where the bargaining status is self-reported by the establishment and the
cross-section dimension is smaller than in the German Structure of Earnings survey used
here (see section 3). While Dustmann et al. (2009) analyze a longer time period up to
2004, our study focuses on the rst half of the 2000s, a time period with strong growth in
wage inequality and a large decline in bargaining coverage. If SBTC raises wage inequality,
this can have eects on the gender wage gap as will be discussed shortly.
A nuanced version of the SBTC hypothesis is provided by the task-based approach
(Autor et al., 2003). It operationalizes the way technology aects the labor market
through the tasks performed at a job. This task-based approach argues that techno-
logical change results in a substitution of routine tasks by computers and other machines.
In principle, it allows to rationalize dierences in the development of wage inequality
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along the wage distribution (Autor and Dorn, 2009). Occupations are distinguished by
the composition of the dierent tasks. However, Antonczyk et al. (2009) nd that a task-
based approach cannot explain the rise in wage inequality among male workers in West
Germany during the rst half of the 2000s. In contrast, analyzing the reduction in the gen-
der wage gap between 1979 and 1999 in Germany, Black and Spitz-Oener (2007) provide
evidence that the change in task inputs partly explains the reduction of the gender wage
gap, suggesting that the demand for tasks disproportionately performed by women has
increased over time. Although our data do not contain information on tasks, it is inter-
esting to analyze the relationship between workplace related variables and the evolution
of the gender wage gap for a more recent time period.
It has been widely studied that collective bargaining compresses the wage distribution,
partly by compressing the returns to productivity relevant characteristics and partly by
compressing the distribution of workers' characteristics (Card, 1996, 2001; Card et al.,
2003; OECD, 2004; Fitzenberger and Kohn, 2005; Gerlach and Stephan, 2006; Burda
et al., 2008). This compression eect is attributed to the preference of unions for greater
wage equality. In contrast, there exists only a small literature linking the level and the
evolution of the gender wage gap to the wage bargaining regime (Gartner and Stephan,
2009, 2004; Felgueroso et al., 2008; Blau and Kahn, 2003, 1996; OECD, 2004). Our paper
contributes to this literature and we now discuss the theoretical arguments for this link.
If collective wage bargaining compresses the wage distribution and women earn lower
wages than men, a decline in bargaining coverage is likely to increase the gender wage gap
(Blau and Kahn, 2003; Edin and Richardson, 2002). Moreover, wage compression tends
to be strongest at the bottom of the wage distribution, so that the gender wage gap is
expected to increase over the wage distribution (Felgueroso et al., 2008). Even if rms pay
a \wage cushion" (Cardoso and Portugal, 2005), i.e. the eective wage exceeds the collec-
tively negotiated wage, wage bargaining provides group specic minimum wages, which
are more likely to be binding at the bottom of the wage distribution. Wage compression
could be achieved via dierent channels which are of course strongly interrelated.
On the one hand, wage compression is achieved by lower returns to human capital or
other productivity relevant characteristics. Therefore, coecients in a Mincer earnings
equation will be specic to the bargaining regime. Since, on average, female workers
have lower formal education levels than male workers, the attenuation of the wage re-
turns under collective bargaining reduces the gender wage gap.5 Furthermore, Bartolucci
5However, reduced returns to human capital could entail a repercussion eect on skill acquisition,
whose direction is ambiguous from theory (Blau and Kahn, 2003, p. 112). On the one hand, lower returns
to human capital discourage skill acquisition and women may be more sensitive to these disincentives. On
the other hand, the resulting lower gender wage gap could induce more women to participate in the labor
market. Quantifying this repercussion eect is impossible with our cross-sectional data on employees
only.
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(2009) nds that a large share (82%) of the gender wage gap in Germany is accounted for
by productivity dierences between male and female workers and 12.5% by gender dif-
ferences in bargaining power (in Nash bargaining on rents between individual rms and
individual employees).6 This evidence suggests that there is a lot of heterogeneity in wage
setting, which collective wage bargaining is likely to reduce. Along this line, Gartner and
Stephan (2009) argue that the standardization of collectively negotiated wages restricts
the opportunities for wage discrimination, e.g. with respect to gender. In addition, it is
commonly argued that women are more risk averse than men and therefore prefer less
variable remuneration schemes (Dohmen and Falk, 2010). This would suggest that women
select themselves to a larger extent than men into jobs covered by collective bargaining
involving less variable pay. Furthermore, female workers should resist more strongly the
erosion of wage bargaining. If a growing use of variable remuneration schemes causes
the increase in wage inequality, it is likely that the decline in wage bargaining should be
weaker for females than for males.
On the other hand, collective bargaining is likely to reduce the heterogeneity of em-
ployees, due to the minimum wage character of negotiated wages or due to self-selection
into covered rms (Heinze and Wolf, 2006; Gartner and Stephan, 2004). This might stem
from the fact that rms adapt their hiring standards to the productivity level required
for paying the collectively negotiated wage and train employees with a lower productivity
(Gartner and Stephan, 2009; Gerlach and Stephan, 2006). Then, highly productive work-
ers may opt out of covered rms (Gartner and Stephan, 2009) or demand payment above
the collectively negotiated (minimum) wage level. The higher homogeneity of employees
should reduce the gender wage gap in covered rms (Heinze and Wolf, 2006). At the same
time, the gender wage gap should dier across bargaining regimes and personal charac-
teristics should explain a part of the gap. Furthermore, the gender wage gap has been
found to increase at the bottom of the unconditional wage distribution (this is a version
of the \glass oor" eect, see e.g. de la Rica et al., 2008). The minimum wage character
of bargained wages should reduce the \glass oor" eect for covered rms compared to
rms without union coverage.
So far, we have discussed a positive association between coverage by collective bar-
gaining and the relative wages of females. However, it is conceivable that unions represent
more strongly the interests of male employees { e.g. because males display higher member-
ship rates or because they are working more frequently full-time (Booth and Francesconi,
2003, Arulampalam et al., 2007, p.179). Thus, the median voter in the union is likely
to be a male employee and therefore the design of union wage policies may result in
6Bartolucci (2009) estimates these results based on a structural search and matching model not dis-
tinguishing between full-time and part-time employment. When correcting for hours of work, the pro-
ductivity related share of the gender wage gap falls to 77% and the share associated with dierences in
bargaining power increases to 16.4%.
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an increase in the gender wage gap, e.g. by favoring blue-collar workers who are pre-
dominantly male. However, this view stands in contrast to Blau and Kahn (1996) and
Felgueroso et al. (2008) who suggest that equal pay policies can be better enforced by
more centralized bargaining. In this vein, Felgueroso et al. (2008) argue that unions rep-
resent more strongly the interests of employees at the bottom of the wage distribution (in
Spain), where there is a disproportionately higher number of females. Another possible
implication of the median voter argument is that the gender wage gap may be larger
under rm-level bargaining, where male union members in the rm have a stronger say,
than under industry-wide bargaining, where general equality goals of the union are likely
to play a stronger role. This implication is in line with the common nding that more
decentralized wage bargaining is associated with higher wage inequality (OECD, 2004).
Furthermore, it is likely that coverage is an increasing function of union membership in
the relevant segment of the labor market (Fitzenberger et al., 2010). Dierences in union
membership rates between female and male employees may lead to gender dierences
in coverage even though within the same rm there is no gender dierence in coverage.
Therefore, the share of female employees may be one determinant of coverage and explain
the dierent union strengths over dierent industries. This argument implies that the
industry composition shifts away from manufacturing towards the service sector over
time is associated with a decline in coverage and overall wage inequality is expected to
increase. Because labor demand in segments with a large share of females increases, the
gender wage gap is likely to fall (similar to Black and Spitz-Oener, 2007).
Finally, the so-called \wage cushion" may aect the gender wage gap. The extent to
which rms pay extra wage components such as bonuses (\wage drift" or \wage cushion",
see Cardoso and Portugal, 2005) can add to the gender wage gap and is potentially
related to the degree of centralization of collective bargaining (Felgueroso et al., 2008).
The underlying reason is that more decentralized collective bargaining is likely to have
already taken account of the specic conditions in a rm. In consequence, this implies a
lower gender wage gap for rm-level bargaining compared to sectoral bargaining.
Based on these opposing considerations, the direction of the link between coverage
and the gender wage gap is theoretically ambiguous, which provides a motivation for our
empirical analysis.
3 Data and descriptive statistics
We use the 2001 and 2006 repeated cross-sections of the German Structure of Earn-
ings Survey (GSES; \Gehalts- und Lohnstrukturerhebung"), a large mandatory linked
employer-employee data set, which is very reliable due to its compulsory character. This
is one of the rst studies to use the 2006 cross-section of the GSES while the 2001 wave of
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the GSES (and earlier waves) has been frequently used to analyze wage dierences across
bargaining regimes.7 These data allow for a very detailed analysis of the wage distribution
because of the link between employer-specic information and employee information and
because of its large size. Two further advantages of the GSES, standing in contrast to
the IAB linked employer-employee data set (LIAB; used e.g. by Dustmann et al., 2009),
are that hours of work are reported and that earnings are neither truncated nor censored
(Kohn and Lembcke, 2007; Fitzenberger and Reize, 2002). Moreover, even though the
sampling design asks rms to provide data only on a fraction of their workforce, many
rms in 2006 prefer to supply data on all employees. The data set is based on a random
sample of all German rms with at least ten employees and the focus is on the private
sector (comparable to Drolet and Mumford, 2009). We limit our analysis to those indus-
tries for which data are available in both years.8 Sampling weights are provided to be
able to make the sample representative for all employees in the included industries.
This study focuses on prime age employees in West Germany. We drop employees
currently taking part in vocational training or an internship as well as all employees
younger than 25 or older than 55 years of age. Given the heterogeneity in wage trends
between West and East Germany, (see e.g. Kohn and Lembcke, 2007; Gernandt and
Pfeier, 2007; Orlowski and Riphahn, 2009), we restrict our analysis to West Germany.
In addition, we only analyze employees working full time, i.e. those paid at least 30
hours per week including overtime in October 2001 or 2006.9 The nal sample involves
440,000 employees in some 17,000 establishments in 2001 and 750,000 employees in 22,600
establishments in 2006.
The GSES provides precise information on whether an employee is covered by one of
the collective bargaining regimes, i.e. sectoral or rm-level bargaining: Following Burda
et al. (2008), we dene a covered employee as anybody working in a covered establish-
ment, i.e. an establishment that pays at least one percent of its employees according to a
collective wage agreement.10
The wage is dened as October earnings including overtime pay and bonuses for Sun-
day or shift work, divided by hours paid in October including overtime hours (similar to
e.g. Drolet and Mumford, 2009). It is important to include premia as those are often
regular and important wage components (Fitzenberger et al., 2008). For plausibility, we
7See among others Stephan and Gerlach (2005); Gerlach and Stephan (2006, 2005); Heinbach and
Spindler (2007); Fitzenberger et al. (2008); and Burda et al. (2008).
8Most of all, this excludes the educational and the health sector.
9On the one hand, this selection of individuals makes the sample more homogeneous and comparable,
see e.g. Hinz and Gartner (2005). On the other hand it abstracts from the selectivity aspect, see Beblo
et al. (2003).
10The negotiated wages in the collective agreements act as minimum wage for non-covered individuals
in covered rms, see Fitzenberger et al. (2008) for evidence along this line.
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limit working hours to a maximum of 304 hours per month11 and the hourly wage to
values between 4 and 70 euro per hour.12 We use the CPI to deate the 2006 wages to
the price level in 2001. As outcome variable, we use the log gross real hourly wage.
We observe some notable changes in the wage distribution from 2001 to 2006 (gure
1 and table 2 in the appendix): Real hourly wages drop below the median, for both
males and females, whereas they increase for the quantiles above the median, leading to
an overall increase in wage dispersion. The increase in wage dispersion has also been
found by Gartner and Stephan (2009) who note that wage dispersion is lower for females
compared to males.13;14 Considering the interquartile range of log-wages as a measure for
wage dispersion, males and females in West Germany experienced an increase in wage
dispersion of 7 log percentage points (ppoints). Figure 1 further shows that the increases
in wage dispersion are mainly driven by real wage losses at the bottom of the wage
distribution, as has also been found by Gernandt and Pfeier (2007). We observe an
increase in wage inequality within the dierent bargaining regimes for both male and
female employees. Moreover, the bottom panels in table 2 show that wage dispersion is
largest in establishments not being covered by collective wage bargaining.
The unconditional gender wage gap displays a U-shaped pattern with largest values
at the upper and the lower end of the distribution (gure 5 and table 2). This is prima
facie evidence of a \glass-ceiling" as well as of a \glass oor" eect for female employees.
The same U-shaped pattern is documented by Arulampalam et al. (2007) for the private
sector in Germany on the basis of pooled ECHP data from 1994-2001. Our data show
that from 2001 to 2006, women are able to gain most relative to men in the lower part of
the wage distribution.15
Further descriptive statistics can be found in table 5 in the appendix. The results
show that women have on average lower age, tenure, and education than men, whereas
male employees more often worked extra shifts involving additional bonuses.
In line with international evidence (Card et al., 2003), collective bargaining coverage
fell in Germany between 2001 and 2006, see table 1. Similar results for Germany are
found e.g. by Kohaut and Ellguth (2008). Distinguishing between industry-wide and rm-
specic collective bargaining, the decline is larger for sectoral bargaining (in absolute as
well as in relative terms). While industry-wide collective bargaining covers more than
11This corresponds to an average of 70 hours per week and to less than 0.2% of the workforce in 2006.
12In 2001 prices. Both bounds together correspond to less than 0.3% of the wage distribution in 2006.
13Many other studies document the rise in wage inequality in Germany as well (see e.g. Dustmann
et al., 2009; Kohn, 2006; Gernandt and Pfeier, 2007; Antonczyk et al., 2009).
14Al-farhan (2010, p. 17) discusses that the strong changes in wage inequality were accompanied by
very mild changes in wage levels and therefore the former is more interesting to study.
15Additional results stratied by education levels (not shown here) reveal that, over time, relative
wages rise most strongly for low-educated women, whereas the gender wage gap widens or stagnates for
the high-skilled individuals. The results for medium-skilled employees are mixed.
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Table 1: Individual coverage rates
2001 2006 2006-2001
Male Female Male Female Male Female
No Coll. Barg. 28.7 32.8 45.2 51.9 16.5 19.1
Industry-wide Barg. 63.1 59.6 46.8 41.1 -16.3 -18.5
Firm-level Barg. 8.3 7.6 8.0 7.0 -0.3 -0.6
60% of the workforce in 2001, this share plummets to 46.8% for males and to 41.1% for
females in 2006. Coverage under a rm-level collective contract also decreases, albeit only
to a small degree. Still, this drop is notable as it stands in contrast to expectations in the
past that rms would use more rm-level bargaining to achieve more exibility. However,
our results suggest that many rms dropped out of collective bargaining altogether. As a
consequence, in 2006 about half of the workforce considered in our data set is not covered
by collective agreements anymore. Note, that the drop in collective bargaining coverage
is more pronounced for females than for males, especially in relative terms for rm-level
bargaining.
There are some notable dierences in wage levels and wage trends by bargaining
regime and gender (table 2 and gures 2 to 4). For males, highest wages are paid over the
entire distribution in the rm-level bargaining regime. For females, this holds only for the
upper half of the wage distribution, whereas in the lower half industry-wide bargaining
provides highest wages. For males, the wage distribution under rm-level bargaining
clearly dominates the wage distribution of employees under industry-wide bargaining in
a rst order stochastic sense. In turn, the latter dominates the wage distribution of
uncovered employees (see also Burda et al., 2008).
A comparison of the dierent bargaining regimes shows that in 2001 the gender wage
gap under industry-wide bargaining is higher in most parts of the distribution than with-
out collective bargaining coverage. However, this ordering is reversed in 2006. The higher
level of the gender wage gap under collective bargaining in 2001 is in contrast to the
results reported by Gartner and Stephan (2009), who do not provide a full distribution
and use top-coded daily wages from 2001. At the mean, their results imply that the
gender wage gap under collective bargaining is about 6 to 8 ppoints lower than without
a collective bargaining agreement. Interestingly, the results by Felgueroso et al. (2008,
p. 307) for Spain in 2002 are very similar to our results for 2006. This even holds for
the peculiar shape of the gender wage gap under rm-level bargaining. In particular the
authors document a rise in the gender wage gap at the top of the distribution, which we
also nd. In addition, our data show an increased gender wage gap at the bottom of the
distribution (\glass oor") for both types of collective wage bargaining in both 2001 and
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2006.16 Over time, we nd that the gender wage gap decreases under sectoral bargaining,
while it increases at the top the wage distribution without bargaining coverage, and even
more so under rm-level bargaining. A possible interpretation is that the reduction in
coverage might have prevented a further decline of the gender wage gap. This issue will
be explored in more detail by the sequential decomposition approach developed in the
next section.
4 Methodology
To analyze eects on the entire wage distribution, the empirical investigation uses a set
of linear quantile regression estimates. This allows to describe wage compression due to
collective bargaining (Fitzenberger et al., 2008; Burda et al., 2008) and its impact on the
dierence between wage distributions by gender. We specify the th quantile of log hourly
wages w conditional on the set of covariates X as:
(1) qw( jX) = X 0() :
We estimate such quantile regressions separately for each year, for each wage bargaining
regime, and for male and female workers on the basis of an extended Mincer-type wage
equation.
Analogously to an OLS regression, a quantile regression uses sampling weights and
inference should account for clustering at the employer level. Standard errors of the
quantile regression coecients therefore need to be adjusted appropriately.17 We imple-
ment a pairwise (design-matrix) bootstrap and we account for the sampling weights by
resampling the weights as part of the observation vector. We estimate clustered standard
errors by applying a block bootstrap procedure where we resample all observations within
an establishment to account for correlation within establishments.18
4.1 Decomposition of unconditional distributions by quantiles
We rst decompose the change in the wage distribution over time by gender over the entire
wage distribution. Then, we decompose the change in the gender wage gap. We investigate
the dierences in the wage distribution by quantile  of the respective unconditional wage
distribution. We use the Machado and Mata (2005) decomposition approach for quantile
16Note that one should be cautious not to overinterpret a cross-country comparison of the gender wage
gaps, as selection processes might dier (see Albrecht et al., 2009b).
17Fitzenberger et al. (2008) show how to estimate the asymptotic covariance matrix [V AR(^()) ac-
counting for weights and cluster eects.
18Due to the large size of the data set and the sequential nature of the estimation, bootstrapping is
extremely slow. Therefore, the present results rely on 50 bootstrap replications only.
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regression which is an extension of the standard Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition technique
(Oaxaca, 1973; Blinder, 1973).
For the analysis of the gender wage gap, one can decompose the dierence of the
unconditional sample quantile functions for the  th quantile between male and female
employees (denoted by q^male() and q^female()) as follows:
19
q^male()  q^female() =

q^male()  q^f ;xm()

+

q^f ;xm()  q^female()

:(2)
The rst term on the right hand side of equation (2) denotes the coecients eect. The
second term captures the eect of workers' characteristics. q^f ;xm() is the estimated
counterfactual quantile function.20 This is the quantile function of wages that would be
generated for female workers had they male characteristics (xm: male characteristics)
but were still paid according to female coecients (f : female coecients across all
quantiles).21 We use this counterfactual because it is the more policy relevant one (as
compared to using a counterfactual distribution using female characteristics and male
coecients) for the following reason. The characteristics of the female population may
be altered over time by policy interventions (e.g. through additional education), while
the coecients, which we interpret as prices (specic wage policies) and as the impact of
unobservables,22 are more dicult to be inuenced in a market economy. Analogous to
the gender wage gap, we decompose the changes in the gender specic wage distributions
and the implied changes in the gender wage gap between 2001 and 2006. For this case,
we focus on counterfactual wage distributions based on 2006 characteristics and 2001
coecients.
The crucial underlying assumption for the estimation of a counterfactual wage distri-
19For ease of notation, we discuss the decomposition approach explicitly for the gender wage gap.
The decomposition of the changes over time by gender works in an analogous way, where male should
be replaced by the year 2006 and female should be replaced by the year 2001. Our empirical analysis
also combines the two decompositions by analyzing the change in the gender wage gap over time. This
corresponds to the dierence of the period-specic gender wage gaps over time and is analogous to the
dierence in the gender-specic changes over time.
20Comparing the quantile regression based approach to DiNardo et al. (1996), the collection of quantile
specic coecients measures the pricing function given characteristics, i.e. it measures how the conditional
distribution of wages is aected by changes in characteristics. The regression setup allows to estimate
dierent counterfactual wage distributions based on the respective sample (estimated counterfactual,
see section 4.2 below) distribution of characteristics. This is analogous to the reweighting approach of
DiNardo et al. (1996).
21These female coecients model the female conditional wage distribution for given characteristics.
Analogously, the counterfactual q^f ;xm() can be interpreted as the quantile of the hypothetical wage
distribution of male workers (xm) were they paid like female employees (f ).
22In a quantile regression framework, the dierences in coecients across quantiles reect the condi-
tional distribution of the dependent variable given the covariates, thus reecting the distribution of unob-
servable characteristics of individuals with given covariates. Constant wage returns (prices) of covariates
imply constant coecients across quantiles. However, the heterogeneous coecients across quantiles do
not explicitly measure the distribution of wage returns.
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bution is that a change in the covariates X will not change the parameters of the condi-
tional distribution of w given covariates X (e.g. Chernozhukov et al., 2008). Hence, our
decomposition technique ignores general equilibrium eects by assuming that changes in
quantities (characteristics eect) do not aect changes in prices (coecients eect). This
is similar to alternative decomposition techniques used in the literature (e.g. DiNardo
et al., 1996; Fairlie, 2005).
To implement the Machado and Mata (2005) decomposition, we use the approach
proposed by Melly (2005) for greater ease in computation. We estimate the counterfactual
quantile function as
(3) q^f ;xm() = inf
 
q :
1
Nmale
X
j:male
F^female(qjXj)  
!
;
where Nmale is the number of male employees in the sample fj : maleg. F^female(qjXj) is
the conditional distribution function of wages in the sample of females evaluated at the
characteristics Xj of the male worker j.
To estimate the unconditional counterfactual distribution based on these conditional
quantiles, we should aggregate the conditional distribution function in the sample of inter-
est based on the estimated conditional quantiles q^w( jXj) according to equation (3). We
resort to an approximation suggested in the literature (Machado and Mata, 2005; Melly,
2005), because an exact aggregation is feasible but computationally very demanding.23
We arrange the predicted conditional quantiles for a large number of equispaced quantiles
and all individuals and then take the th sample quantile of this augmented sample. This
way, we approximate the conditional distribution Ffemale(qjXj) by a discrete uniform dis-
tribution on the set of equispaced quantiles. More precisely, we estimate 49 equispaced
quantile regressions starting at the 2%-quantile.24 We use this technique to decompose
the gender wage gap for the total wage distribution in each year before isolating the con-
tribution of dierent components in a more detailed sequential decomposition explained
in the following.
4.2 Sequential Decomposition
To assess the importance of various components of the characteristics and coecients
eect, we suggest to estimate a sequence of counterfactual wage distributions. We do
so by changing incrementally the distribution of subsets of covariates for the characteris-
23Albrecht et al. (2009a) show that the results are the same.
24Instead of treating  as a uniformly distributed random variable on [0; 1],  is treated as uniformly
distributed on the 49 even percentiles. This way, we avoid estimation of the entire process of quantile
regression coecients, which in our case involves a very large number of break points (Melly, 2005).
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tics eects and of subsets of the corresponding coecients, respectively, holding all other
components constant. For the estimation of counterfactual combinations in the joint dis-
tribution of the characteristics, we account for the observed joint sample distribution of
characteristics in the reference year. The decomposition results depend upon the sequence
of decompositions implemented (DiNardo et al., 1996; Chernozhukov et al., 2008). This
is unavoidable because each sequence stands for a dierent series of counterfactual wage
distributions. We suggest an order of decomposition for which we think the sequence of
counterfactuals is of interest.25 We also estimate an alternative sequence of our decom-
position, in reversed order, as a robustness check and we provide an interpretation of the
dierences in results.
Even though there have been various approaches to estimating the impact of single
covariates or their coecients in a decomposition analysis, none of these approaches is
suitable for our analysis. The literature on measuring inequality typically considers in-
equality measures which are additively decomposable such as the Theil inequality measure
or the variance of log incomes (see e.g. Fields, 1979 or, as a recent application, Cholezas
and Tsakloglou, 2007). In an analysis of the variance, one can decompose the eects of
subsets of covariates into main eects and interaction eects in an additive way. It is,
however, not possible to divide the interaction eects without further assumptions. In
contrast, no additive decomposition is available if one is interested in broad features of a
distribution reected in various quantiles or quantile dierences. We will now discuss two
potential approaches and their drawbacks before turning to our suggested decomposition.
Fairlie (1999, 2005) suggests to decompose dierences in rst moments estimated as
nonlinear functions of the covariates into the characteristics eect and the coecients
eect. This is done by constructing the sample means of the tted values based on the
characteristics in one sample and the coecients in another sample.26 For a sequential
decomposition of the contribution of subsets of covariates, Fairlie (2005) suggests to order
observations in both samples by the tted values of the estimated nonlinear functions.
Then, to construct the counterfactuals involving combinations of covariates from dierent
samples, the observations in the two samples are matched one-to-one by the ranks in the
two samples. This procedure requires both samples to be of the same size and, if this is
not the case, Fairlie suggests using a random subsample of the larger sample. However,
this procedure does not explicitly take account of the joint distribution of the covariates
in the two samples which is likely to be relevant for constructing a set of counterfactual
wage distributions. Furthermore, the procedure disregards available information by only
using a subsample of the larger sample.
25Our sequential decomposition involves seven components. It would be beyond the scope of this paper
to report all the conceivable 7! = 5040 permutations of the sequence of decompositions.
26Fairlie discusses probit and logit estimates. His analysis, however, also applies to more general
nonlinear estimation approaches.
15
Yun (2004) suggests a decomposition of the contribution of individual covariates and
their coecients.27 He discusses this for the case where rst moments are estimated
as nonlinear functions of a linear index function of the covariates without interaction
terms. Yun suggests to assign the characteristics eect and the coecients eect to the
individual covariates according to weights implied by the relative dierences in the means
of the linear index. This method is restricted to functions of separable linear indices
and it ignores the dependence between dierent covariates. Even in the case of linear
quantile regression with dierent separable linear specications at dierent quantiles, the
Yun weights are not dened unambiguously.
We now describe an alternative sequential decomposition approach suitable for the
estimation of quantile regression. As discussed in section 2, wage bargaining, rm charac-
teristics, and personal characteristics might inuence the wage structure through various
channels which we are trying to capture. Our approach is based on the sequential decom-
position suggested in DiNardo et al. (1996) and developed further in Chernozhukov et al.
(2008) and Antonczyk et al. (2009).
The quantiles of the observed wage distributions for the two cross-sections of data in
2001 and 2006 are expressed as follows:
(4) q01 (
01
P ; 
01
F ; 
01
B ; 
01
0 ; B
01; F 01; P 01) and q06 (
06
P ; 
06
F ; 
06
B ; 
06
0 ; B
06; F 06; P 06) ;
where P and F denote sets of personal and rm characteristics and P and F refer to
the corresponding sets of coecients. Furthermore, B is an indicator for the collective
bargaining regime with B 2 fno, general, rmg. B0 are the intercepts from the 3 dier-
ent regressions for the 3 dierent bargaining regimes and 0 =
1
3

no0 + 
general
0 + 
firm
0

and B = 
B
0   0.28;29 The superscripts 01 and 06 indicate the years. These dierent
components set the foundation for the following sequential decomposition, where we sep-
arately analyze the contribution of each of the arguments in order to explain the change
in the wage distributions by gender over time (similar to Antonczyk et al., 2009). For a
meaningful analysis of the change in intercepts, we normalize all covariates with respect
to their 2001 means.
Our goal is to explain the observed wage structure in the most recent available year, i.e.
in 2006. In order to do so, we take the perspective of individuals in 2006 and successively
transfer them 'back in time' to the labor market in 2001. This is why we will rst alter the
returns (coecients) to labor market characteristics. Thereafter, we quantify the eect
27A very recent application of this method can be found in Al-farhan (2010).
28Note that P , F , and B may dier by the type of bargaining regime. For each individual we
employ the coecients which correspond to her bargaining status B.
29We use the observed wage distributions in 2001 and 2006 for q01 and q
06
 in equation 4. However,
as discussed by Melly (2005), one could also estimate the observed distribution based on the quantile
regression estimates.
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of reduced bargaining coverage and of changes in the rm characteristics. The nal step
consists in changing the individual-specic characteristics from their 2006 levels to their
counterparts from 2001. We acknowledge that the order of the sequential decomposition
steps matters. A dierent order corresponds to a dierent sequence of counterfactuals
and our interpretation of results is specic to our chosen sequence of counterfactuals.
Our sequence of counterfactuals reads as follows:
1 = q
06
 (
06
P ; 
06
F ; 
06
B ; 
06
0 ; B
06; F 06; P 06)  q06 (01P ; 06F ; 06B ; 060 ; B06; F 06; P 06)(5)
2 = q
06
 (
01
P ; 
06
F ; 
06
B ; 
06
0 ; B
06; F 06; P 06)  q06 (01P ; 01F ; 06B ; 060 ; B06; F 06; P 06)
3 = q
06
 (
01
P ; 
01
F ; 
06
B ; 
06
0 ; B
06; F 06; P 06)  q06 (01P ; 01F ; 01B ; 060 ; B06; F 06; P 06)
4 = q
06
 (
01
P ; 
01
F ; 
01
B ; 
06
0 ; B
06; F 06; P 06)  q06 (01P ; 01F ; 01B ; 010 ; B06; F 06; P 06)
5 = q
06
 (
01
P ; 
01
F ; 
01
B ; 
01
0 ; B
06; F 06; P 06)  q06 (01P ; 01F ; 01B ; 010 ;B01; F 06; P 06)
6 = q
06
 (
01
P ; 
01
F ; 
01
B ; 
01
0 ; B
01; F 06; P 06)  q06 (01P ; 01F ; 01B ; 010 ; B01;F01; P 06)
7 = q
06
 (
01
P ; 
01
F ; 
01
B ; 
01
0 ; B
01; F 01; P 06)  q01 (01P ; 01F ; 01B ; 010 ; B01; F 01;P01)
The rst component of our sequence of decompositions is 1 estimating the impact
of changes in the returns to observable individual-specic characteristics. Recall at this
point that the decomposition does not account for the eect of changes in characteristics
on coecients (absence of general equilibrium eects). Note that we know that union
coverage reduces returns to productivity relevant characteristics and that this eect is
captured through the bargaining regime specic coecient estimates of P . Therefore, it is
accounted for by the rst component. However, these bargaining regime specic changes in
coecients could be caused by the decline in union coverage because the outside option of
low{productivity employees regarding rent sharing within rms deteriorates (Bartolucci,
2009). This is a characteristics eect which our decomposition attributes to the personal
coecients eect.
The next step changes the returns to rm characteristics, thereby estimating the coun-
terfactual wage distribution for individuals in 2006, as if they were exposed to the labor
market remunerations in 2001 in terms of personal and rm coecients (2 ). After
having controlled for changes in the coecients of personal and rm characteristics, we
quantify the impact of the changes in the wage premia related to the three dierent types
of wage bargaining (3 ). Recall that the coecients reecting the bargaining premia
17
are constructed as deviations from the mean of the bargaining-regime-specic intercepts.
The change of the average constant 0 from 
01
0 to 
06
0 represents the residual change in
the overall wage level over time which cannot be explained by the variables included in
our model. Here, the new counterfactual represents the wage distribution implied if all
individuals had retained their 2006 characteristics and bargaining regime, but would have
been paid as in 2001.
The sum 1 + 
2
 + 
3
 + 
4
 represents the (total) coecients eect in a Blinder-
Oaxaca type decomposition. Next, we consider the corresponding characteristics eect.
So far, simply plugging in the 2001 coecients in combination with 2006 characteris-
tics has been sucient to calculate the corresponding counterfactual wage distributions.
However, changing the characteristics sequentially is not straightforward.
We start with what would have happened if bargaining coverage was still at its 2001
level but all other characteristics remained at their 2006 levels. The contribution of the
decline in bargaining coverage is denoted by 5 . In order to model the link between the
bargaining regime and other characteristics, we run a sequential probit of the bargaining
regime on 2001 characteristics.30 The rst step of the sequential probit models the cov-
erage by collective bargaining versus no coverage. The second step models the decision
between industry-wide and rm-level bargaining conditional on coverage. We account
for the correlation between the error terms in the two equations. Using the resulting
estimates, we then simulate the bargaining regime in 2001 conditional on rm and per-
sonal characteristics from 2006.31 Hence, 5 aims at quantifying the eect of the decline
of bargaining coverage for given rm and person characteristics. Note that bargaining
coverage varies strongly by rm size and industry. Changes in rm characteristics could
be associated with further changes in bargaining coverage, so that 5 presents a rather
conservative estimate.
The next step of the decomposition involves the change in rm characteristics F (6 ).
To mimic the rm characteristics from 2001 for individuals from 2006, we use exact one-
to-one matching with replacement on the basis of personal characteristics, in order to
assign to each individual from 2006 a statistical twin in 2001. This takes account of the
selection process of individuals into rms based on observable characteristics.
So far we have taken the perspective of individuals from 2006. As nal step, we
estimate the contribution of changes in personal characteristics by subtracting the wage
distribution in 2001 from the last counterfactual wage distribution (7 ).
The complete sequential decomposition of the changes between 2001 and 2006 can be
30Similarly, DiNardo et al. (1996) use a probit model and Chernozhukov et al. (2008) use a logit model
in order to account for the correlation between the covariates and the union status.
31The detailed probit estimates are available upon request. To simulate the counterfactual bargaining
regime which would have prevailed in 2001, we calculate for each individual the implied wage bargaining
regime based on the probit coecient estimates and randomly drawn error terms.
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summarized as follows:
(6) 06=01 = q
06
 (
06
P ; 
06
F ; 
06
B ; 
06
0 ; B
06; F 06; P 06)  q01 (01P ; 01F ; 01B ; 010 ; B01; F 01; P 01)
= 1|{z}
Personal
+ 2|{z}
Firm
+ 3|{z}
Coverage| {z }
Coefficients
+ 4|{z}
Residual
+ 5|{z}
Coverage
+ 6|{z}
Firm
+ 7|{z}
Personal| {z }
Characteristics
We implement the decomposition separately for female and male employees. The gender
dierences by quantiles of the components of the decomposition quantify the decomposi-
tion of the change in the gender wage gap over time.
5 Decomposition results
This section discusses the results of the decomposition of the changes in the wage distri-
bution over time by gender. The dierence between the developments of the male and the
female wage distributions is equivalent to changes in the gender wage gap which will be
discussed as well. As described in the previous section, we implement a detailed sequential
decomposition analysis to estimate the specic contribution of personal characteristics,
rm characteristics, and the bargaining regime as well as their corresponding coecients.
The detailed results of the decomposition analysis are presented in the appendix in form
of tables, reporting results at selected quantiles, and graphs, representing the entire wage
distribution. For the interpretation of the results, note that an upward (downward) slop-
ing line in such a graph represents a situation where the corresponding component of the
decomposition is associated with an increase (decrease) in overall wage inequality. This is
because the implied change in wages is greater (smaller) at higher quantiles as compared
to lower quantiles.
Results for the decomposition of the level of the gender wage gap into the total charac-
teristics and coecients eect, using the standard approach introduced by Machado and
Mata (2005) separately for 2001 and 2006, are given in gure 5. The characteristics eect
and the coecients eect explain approximately the same share of the gender wage gap
in the lower half of the distribution. In contrast, in the upper half, the contribution of
the coecients eect grows much stronger which is in line with the ndings presented by
Felgueroso et al. (2008, p. 313) for Spain, whereas the results from Arulampalam et al.
(2007) for the German private sector exhibit a much atter shape. This contributes to
the higher gender wage gap in the upper half, often referred to as \glass ceiling". Over
time, the U-shaped pattern of the gender wage gap and of the coecients eect attens.
In 2006, the coecients eect explains a larger share of the overall gender wage gap in the
upper part of the wage distribution compared to 2001, i.e. the importance of coecients
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increases over time.
Now, we turn to the sequential decomposition results which allow us to assess the
specic contribution of various components. Table 3 provides a representative set of results
at the rst decile, the median, and the ninth decile. For males, wage growth at the median
amounts to 1 log percentage point (ppoint), while the change in bargaining coecients
and the change in the bargaining regime would have implied a fall of 1.3 and 1 ppoints,
respectively. However, this is overcompensated by the changes in personal coecients
(+1.1), rm coecients (+1.1), and rm characteristics (+1.3). Residual wage growth (-
.5) and changes in personal characteristics (+.3) only play a minor role. In contrast to the
median, wages at the rst decile decrease by 8.8 ppoints, implying a 9.8 ppoints increase
in the 50-10 dierential. As the largest component, changes in rm coecients contribute
3.6 ppoints to this decline. In addition, the change in bargaining coecients (-1.8) and the
change in the bargaining regime (-1.6) contribute signicantly to this fall. At the ninth
decile, wages increase by 4.3 ppoints and again changes in rm coecients contribute the
largest share with 2.1 ppoints. Shifts in the returns to personal characteristics contribute
1.7 ppoints to the increase. However, changes in personal characteristics would have
implied a loss of 2.3 ppoints at the ninth decile. For females, general trends are similar.
Overall wage growth at the median is slightly negative (-.8) and the decline of wages at
the rst decile is more pronounced (-6.8) compared to the median. Personal coecients
contribute to a fall in female wages both at the median (-1.4) and at the rst decile (-3.5).
The components reecting wage bargaining and rm-related covariates and coecients
thereof also contribute to a fall of wages at the rst decile. However, this is mitigated
strongly for females by the changes in personal characteristics (+5.3). Without this
eect, wages at the rst decile for females would have fallen even more strongly than
for males. The ninth decile of female wages increases by 4.6 ppoints. Residual wage
growth (+2.1) contributes the single largest component to this increase, and there are
positive contributions of all three coecients eects, with the bargaining-specic returns
being strongest. There is evidence for a strong increase in wage inequality by gender, i.e.
the 90-10-, 90-50-, and 50-10-dierentials all increase. For instance, the 90-10-dierential
increases by 13.1 ppoints for males and by 11.3 ppoints for females (see bottom panel of
table 3). The decomposition shows that the changes in rm coecients are the single most
important component of this increase in wage inequality and this is driven by the strong
impact of rm coecients on the 50-10-dierential.32 Changes in bargaining coverage
and changes in bargaining coecients also play an important role, but surprisingly, these
eects are stronger in the upper part of the wage distribution. Furthermore changes in
32Gernandt and Pfeier (2007), using the decomposition technique proposed by Juhn et al. (1993),
provide evidence that between 1994 and 2005 almost half of the increase of the 50-10-dierential is
explained by price eects. This result can be thus in line with our nding, stemming from a more
detailed approach.
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personal coecients and residual wage changes contribute to the rise in wage inequality
whereas changes in personal characteristics strongly work against it.
Next, we discuss the sequential decomposition along the entire distribution. The re-
sults are displayed separately for the male and female wage distributions (gures 6 and
7) as well as for the gender wage gap (gure 8).
The personal characteristics involve age, tenure, education, and an indicator for work-
ing extra shifts. The rst component of the decomposition quanties the contribution of
changes in coecients of the personal characteristics to the total change between 2001 and
2006 (see top right graph). These individual-specic coecients add to wage inequality
particularly for females, but the eect is hardly ever signicant. Moreover, these eects
tend to increase the gender wage gap { particularly at the bottom. The same result has
been found by Gartner and Hinz (2009) at the mean.
The rm characteristics involve rm size, industry, region, a dummy for predominantly
public ownership, as well as the shares of male and less than full-time working employees
in that establishment. The changes in the coecients of rm characteristics imply an
increase in wage inequality { in particular at the bottom of the distribution. For males,
this is the largest contribution to increasing wage inequality. As the rm coecients eect
is sizeable, we further decompose it into three components associated with (i) region, (ii)
sector aliation, and (iii) further specic rm characteristics, e.g. rm size (gure 10).
The results show that changes in between- and within-industry wage dierences mainly
drive inequality upwards. In addition, dierent wage schemes according to rm size play a
small role, whereas region coecients are irrelevant. This suggests that the heterogeneity
of rm wage policies has increased both between and within industries, possibly through
the more widespread use of variably payment schemes Dohmen and Falk (2010). As the
developments are very similar for males and females, there is only a small but nonnegligible
eect of these rm-coecients on the gender wage gap, except at the bottom.
Wage dierences between the dierent bargaining regimes raise wage inequality slightly.
Sectoral bargaining apparently drives this trend, as this regime displays the strongest real
wage losses at the rst decile (table 2). The changes in wage dierences across the bar-
gaining regimes tend to reduce the gender wage gap uniformly along the wage distribution
by about 1 ppoint, but the eect is never pointwise signicant.
Unexplained time trends tend to increase wage inequality for both males and females,
with falling wages in the bottom of the distribution and rising wages in the top. The
trend is more positive for females, resulting in a uniform reduction of the gender wage
gap of about 1.3 ppoints which is, however, not pointwise signicant.
Next, we consider the components of the characteristics eect and start with the change
in collective bargaining coverage. Recall that we nd a sharp drop in union coverage over
the period of only ve years. We expect that the strong reduction in collective bargaining
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coverage results in an increase in wage inequality and that this eect is particularly
strong at the bottom of the distribution. In fact, the qualitative pattern of our results is
in line with this expectation for both genders. Put dierently, the change in coverage is
indeed associated with falling wages at the bottom of the wage distribution and increasing
wages in the upper part. However, compared to the results reported in Dustmann et al.
(2009), the eect is surprisingly small! As a further surprise, the eect of the change in
bargaining coverage is convex along the distribution resulting in a stronger eect on rising
dispersion at the top of the distribution.33 As the results are nearly identical for males and
females, the drop in bargaining coverage shows no discernible eect on the gender wage
gap. Recall that the gender wage gap below the median falls both for uncovered workers
and for workers covered by industry-wide bargaining. However, it increases strongly for
rm-level bargaining and the increase is particularly strong at the bottom of the wage
distribution. For the most part, these dierent eects cancel each other.
One may be concerned that changes in sector shares may spuriously capture some
part of the reduction in bargaining coverage. To address this issue, we run bivariate
probit regressions of coverage dummy variables (no coverage, sector-level bargaining, or
rm-level bargaining) on all other rm characteristics and personal covariates. We pool
the data for the years 2001 and 2006 and we add a dummy variable for 2006.34 The
estimated average marginal eects of the year dummy are very similar in size to the overall
changes in coverage reported in the last two columns of table 1.35 Thus, the reduction in
bargaining coverage is almost exclusively taking place for given rm characteristics and
personal characteristics. In particular, it occurs almost exclusively within sectors.36 We
conclude that changes in industry composition as measured by sector shares are not the
main driving force for the drop in collective bargaining coverage.37
Changes in rm characteristics are associated with slightly higher wage inequality
for both male and female employees. This component includes mechanical eects from
33Dustmann et al. (2009) report a larger eect of the decline in union coverage on changes in wage
inequality for males, see footnote 2, and their results indicate a much stronger eect at the bottom of
the wage distribution compared to the top. Their analysis does attribute changes in other covariates,
which are correlated with the decline in union coverage, to the union coverage eect. Our sequential
decomposition approach allows to estimate the partial eect of changes in union coverage, holding these
other covariates constant.
34The detailed probit results are available upon request.
35The marginal eect for no collective wage bargaining coverage is 15.6 ppoints for males and 18.2
ppoints for females (both 0.9 ppoints below the corresponding numbers in table 1).
36To investigate this issue further in a systematic way, gure 12 plots the employment shares (in percent)
by sector against the sector specic coverage rates and connects the data points for 2001 and 2006 for
each sector. This evidence shows that there is no systematic link between coverage rates and employment
shares or the changes thereof, and that sector 28 seems to be an outlier. The descriptive results reported
in Tables 6 and 7 show that sector 28, comprising service sectors with low coverage, grows strongly
between 2001 and 2006 potentially due to changes in the denition. The graphical evidence conrms
that, on average, the reduction in coverage occurs within sectors.
37However, our data do not allow us to further distinguish between other explanations for this decline.
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changes in the industry composition. The patterns are concave, i.e. the eect is signi-
cantly negative and stronger at the bottom of the distribution. For males, the eect is
signicantly positive at the top while for females it is negative and zero at the top. Put
together, changes in rm characteristics are associated with an approximately 1.7 ppoints
higher gender wage gap, an eect which is mostly signicant along the distribution.
Finally, changes in personal characteristics tend to reduce wage inequality. This eect
entails skill upgrading or the like. Interestingly, Al-farhan (2010, table 7) nds a similar
result by using mainly person-specic covariates for West Germany 2002-2006. His results
show large eects of education, potential experience, the occupational position and rm
size, whereas in our study the latter is subsumed in the rm-specic eects. For both
genders, we nd a falling eect which is very strong for females at the bottom of the
distribution. Thus, changes in personal characteristics by themselves would have resulted
in a sizeable decline of the gender wage gap at the bottom and at the very top.38 Hence,
females have 'upgraded' their personal characteristics but this is counteracted to a very
large extent by other components. The same result is found by Edin and Richardson
(2002) for a time period where Sweden experienced a similar stagnation of the gender
wage gap (1981-1991, see ibid. p. 139). Applying the wording of Blau and Kahn (1997),
women are `swimming against the stream' but not `upstream' anymore.
To contrast the eects of workplace related characteristics with personal characteris-
tics, we also provide evidence for the sum of bargaining and rm eects both for coecients
and characteristics eects (gure 9). We literally sum the terms from 1 and 
2
 for the
combined coecients eect and the terms 6 and 
7
 for the combined characteristics ef-
fects (see equation 5). The results show that both eects contribute in an important way
to the increase in wage inequality along the entire distribution and that the contribution
of the coecients eect dominates the characteristics eect.
As a robustness check, we reversed the order of the decomposition (see appendix A
and gures 13 to 15). The results remain qualitatively the same. Above all, the eects
of collective wage bargaining remain of minor importance.39 Merely, the importance of
the personal characteristics increases and the rm coecients eect decreases. These
changes can be interpreted in a meaningful way because they are based on a dierent
sequence of counterfactual wage distributions. The dierences for personal characteristics
imply that personal coecients have changed between 2001 and 2006 in a way that the
changes in personal characteristics matter more in 2006 than in 2001 for wage inequality.
38A similar result is obtained by Hinz and Gartner (2005), who however only analyze the mean.
39The fact that the results for the collective bargaining eects look slightly dierent under the reversed
order has a simple explanation. In 2006 the gender wage gap under rm-level bargaining exhibits a
particularly high level. This implies that the reduction in collective bargaining coverage would reduce
the gender wage gap when measured at coecients from 2006 (i.e. under the reversed order). Still, the
key result remains the same namely that changes in collective bargaining coverage hardly contributed to
changes in the gender wage gap.
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Analogously, the dierence for rm coecients implies that rm characteristics, especially
the sector composition, has changed such that between- and within-industry coecients
changes translate into stronger eects on wage inequality for 2006 rm characteristics
compared to 2001 rm characteristics. Again, these dierences emphasize that the eects
of characteristics changes are stronger in the 2006 labor market than they would have
been in the 2001 labor market.
Returning to our hypothesis about the relation between reduced collective bargaining
coverage and the gender wage gap, we nd hardly any eect. Moreover, the eects do
not vary over the distribution.40 Finding no eect on the gender wage gap is due to
the fact that changes in collective wage bargaining increase wage inequality for males
and females to a very similar extent. This is a justication for why we have analyzed in
depth the wage distributions of males and females separately. Fortin and Lemieux (1997)
nd that deunionization raises wage inequality for males, but that no such eect exists for
females. Instead, females are strongly aected by the minimum wage. For the comparison
of this result to ours, one has to understand that the sharp distinction between union
coverage and the minimum wage does not apply to Germany, because instead collectively
negotiated wages act as a wage oor within covered establishments. Thus, our results
are consistent with Fortin and Lemieux (1997). But how can our results be reconciled
with the correlation between deunionization and the gender wage gap often found in
the literature? Most studies in the literature are based on single cross-sections of data
(Gartner and Stephan, 2009; Felgueroso et al., 2008; Meng and Meurs, 2004). Instead, we
explicitly analyze the change in coverage and the change in the gender wage gap over time.
We nd the \deunionization" has quite a similar eect on male and female wage inequality.
The dynamics appear to be dierent than cross-sectional evidence would suggest. This
could be due to the following three reasons. First, there is a continued application time
limit (\Nachwirkungsfrist") in Germany regulating how quickly formerly covered rms
can stop the application of the terms of collective bargaining. Moreover, the majority of
rms not applying a collective contract directly still use it as a guideline (Kohaut and
Ellguth, 2008). For these reasons, the drop in collective bargaining can have a delayed
eect. Second, the rm dynamics over time obviously have to be considered more closely
as rm closures and start-ups are likely to reduce collective bargaining coverage (Kohaut
and Ellguth, 2008). However, this changing rm structure could also aect the gender
wage gap. Third, although bargaining coverage changes, the selection of individuals into
rms may remain the same, explaining why we do not nd any eect. Finally, it should
be noted that there is very little to be explained in the rst place as the change of the
gender wage gap is zero on average.
40Note that few studies analyze the distributional aspect at all, which makes it dicult to \reconcile"
our results with the literature.
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Summing up, our decomposition analysis statistically explains a major part of the ob-
served changes in the wage distribution by gender between 2001 and 2006. All workplace
related eects (rm plus bargaining regime) contribute to the strong rise in wage inequal-
ity. We nd evidence that the reduction in bargaining coverage has contributed in a
signicant way and that the bargaining outcomes (measured by the coecients) allow for
higher wage inequality (possibly indicating higher wage exibility). However, these eects
are dominated by the rm coecients eect which results in a strong increase in wage
inequality, especially at the bottom of the distribution. This eect is strongly driven
by changes in sector coecients, i.e. by changes in the between- and within-industry
wage dierentials. This evidence indicates that sectors dier strongly in the degree to
which low wage employment is growing in importance over time. More specically, it
suggests stark dierences in wage policies across industries, possibly reecting between-
and within-industry dierences in the division of bargaining power between workers and
rms (Bartolucci, 2009), dierences in labor market conditions for low-skilled workers,
or dierences in the introduction of variable payment schemes (Dohmen and Falk, 2010;
Lemieux et al., 2009). One potential reason may be that sectors dier in the degree by
which they are aected by competition from low-wage countries abundant in low-skilled
employees. Women have been aected more strongly by the changes in rm coecients,
which by themselves would have caused a slight increase in the gender wage gap in the
middle and the top of the wage distribution. However, we nd a small reduction of the
gender wage gap at the bottom of the wage distribution, which is explained by changes in
personal characteristics and changes in rm coecients. Changes in personal coecients
are weakened at the bottom of the wage distribution. Thus, the mechanisms leading to
a reduction of the gender wage gap dominate at the bottom of the wage distribution.
Put dierently, females have been able to "swim upstream at the very bottom", where
males have been done extremely poorly, consistent with the stronger distaste of females
for more variable wages (Dohmen and Falk, 2010). This holds for the uncovered sec-
tor and for industry-wide bargaining, who show a sizeable decline of the gender wage
gap below the median. Only under rm-level bargaining, where male interests are most
likely to dominate, the gender wage gap has increased strongly at the bottom of the wage
distribution.
Overall, our results suggest that both rm-level eects and institutional changes re-
garding wage bargaining contribute signicantly to the rise in wage inequality but that
the rm-level eects clearly dominate, especially for the strong rise in wage inequality
in the bottom of the wage distribution. Firm-level eects may be caused by changes in
labor demand or by changes in rm-wage policies. In contrast, personal characteristics
change in a way to reduce wage inequality and the gender wage gap. Notwithstanding,
personal coecients contribute to some degree to the increase in wage inequality, which
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is likely to reect labor demand eects (as in Albrecht et al., 2009a). These imply rising
returns to labor market skills, which is in line with both the skill biased technical change
hypothesis and the hypothesis that increasing international trade and outsourcing reduce
the relative demand for low-skilled labor in Germany.41
6 Conclusions
Using the German Structure of Earnings Survey, this paper describes the stark increase
in wage inequality between 2001 and 2006 and the associated strong decline in collective
bargaining coverage. We investigate as to whether and to what extent the recent increase
in wage inequality between 2001 and 2006 can be related to the decline in wage bargaining
as well as to changes associated with rm characteristics and with personal characteristics.
Our analysis is restricted to the private sector of the West German economy. We analyze
changes in the wage structure for males and females separately to study the implications on
the gender wage gap. Applying a quantile regression framework, we analyze wage changes
and gender dierentials along the wage distribution. In order to break down the changes
in the wage distribution into those contributions stemming from characteristics and from
coecients eects, we employ the decomposition techniques proposed by Machado and
Mata (2005) and Melly (2005) and we extend the analysis to a sequential procedure similar
to DiNardo et al. (1996) and Chernozhukov et al. (2008). We emphasize that the results of
a sequential decomposition depend upon the chosen sequence of counterfactuals analyzed
and we argue why the applied sequence is meaningful.
Our descriptive results provide new results on trends in wage inequality by gender and
on the gender wage gap. There are some amazing changes between 2001 and 2006. We
quantify the recent rise in wage inequality, which is driven by real wage increases at the top
of the wage distribution as well as by real wage losses below the median. During the ve
years analyzed, the 90-10 wage dierential increases by 13.1 log percentage points for males
and by 11.3 log percentage points for females. In addition, wage dispersion also increases
within each of the dierent types of bargaining regime. The increase in wage inequality
is particularly strong for male workers at the bottom of the wage distribution. During
the same time period, coverage by collective wage bargaining drops by 16.5 percentage
41Although our data do not allow us to identify the type of tasks performed at the workplace, the
heterogeneity of eects across rms (industries) driving the increase of wage inequality is not easy to
rationalize with a simple task-based interpretation of labor market developments in line with Autor et
al. (2003), unless one could show that the observed heterogeneity is driven by changes in tasks and task
remunerations. Antonczyk et al. (2009), based on a dierent data set, nd that a simple task based
approach can not rationalize the recent increase in wage inequality because task changes would have
worked towards a reduction in wage inequality. Nevertheless, in light of the importance of workplace
variables, it would be of interest to analyze the link between the rm heterogeneity in wage trends and
the tasks performed at the workplace by pooling the two data sets in future research.
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points for males and by 19.1 percentage points for females. It comes as a surprise that
not only coverage by sectoral-level bargaining but also coverage by rm-level bargaining
falls over time. As a result, in 2006 only little more than half of West German employees
are working in establishments still being covered by a collective bargaining agreement.
Our sequential decomposition results show that all workplace related eects (rm
eects and bargaining eects) contribute to the strong rise in wage inequality. Although
we nd evidence that the reduction in bargaining coverage adds to this increase in a
sizeable way and that the bargaining outcomes allow for higher wage exibility, these
eects are smaller than the rm coecients eect, being almost exclusively driven by the
sector coecients eect. Moreover, the drop in collective bargaining coverage takes place
almost entirely within the industries. Firm-level eects dominate regarding the strong
rise in wage inequality at the bottom of the wage distribution. The changes in the sector
composition over time reinforce the observed widening in between- and within-industry
wage dierences. In addition, personal coecients add to some degree to the increase in
wage inequality, reinforcing the dominance of labor demand eects. In contrast, personal
characteristics change in a way to reduce wage inequality. All this adds up to minor
changes in the overall gender wage gap, and only the strong improvement in personal
characteristics of females results in a fall of the gender wage gap at the bottom of the
wage distribution, which is, however, accompanied by small increases in the middle of the
distribution. In fact, there are a number of compensating eects. Together, changes in
personal characteristics and in bargaining coecients, as well as residual wage changes,
work towards a reduction of the gender wage gap. However, all rm-level eects act
in favor of a higher gender wage gap. Women are `swimming against the stream' but
not `upstream' anymore (Blau and Kahn, 1997; Sohr and Stephan, 2005), except at the
bottom of the wage distribution, where males are doing extremely poorly.
Our results highlight that the stark decline in collective wage bargaining contributes to
the strong rise in wage inequality in Germany, but that this is by no means the dominating
eect. Firm-level eects (due to changing labor demand or changing wage policies) causing
a stronger heterogeneity in wages (possibly through more variable payment schemes)
are more important, especially across industries at the bottom of the wage distribution.
Firm-level eects also appear to stop the further decline in the gender wage gap in the
middle and the upper part of the wage distribution. Our results open the oor to explore
in further research the specic contribution of international trade, the introduction of
variable payment schemes on the evolution of wage inequality, and the role played by the
labor market reforms. In light of our results, it may not come as a surprise after all that
political calls in Germany for the introduction of a minimum wage for certain sectors have
become more pronounced over the last years.
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Appendix
A Robustness Check
The results of our decomposition analysis depend upon the chosen order of sequence. As a robustness
check we carry out the decomposition analysis in the inverted order compared to the one described in
section 4.2 and contrast the corresponding results to those presented in section 5. We now take the
perspective of individuals from 2001. We start by constructing the new counterfactual wage distribution
which would have prevailed had individuals from 2001 worked in rms from 2006 and had been paid as
in 2006. This counterfactual distribution is subtracted from the unconditional wage distribution in 2006.
The resulting dierence pins down the impact of changes in personal characteristics on changes of the
entire wage distribution and thus on changes of the wage dispersion. We then proceed using this inverted
order. As described in section 4.2 we take possible correlations between the covariates into account. The
alternative sequence we apply reads as follows:
1 = q
06
 (
06
P ; 
06
F ; 
06
B ; 
06
0 ; B
06; F 06; P 06)  q01 (06P ; 06F ; 06B ; 060 ; B06; F 06;P01)
2 = q
01
 (
06
P ; 
06
F ; 
06
B ; 
06
0 ; B
06; F 06; P 01)  q01 (06P ; 06F ; 06B ; 060 ; B06;F01; P 01)
3 = q
01
 (
06
P ; 
06
F ; 
06
B ; 
06
0 ; B
06; F 01; P 01)  q01 (06P ; 06F ; 06B ; 060 ;B01; F 01; P 01)
4 = q
01
 (
06
P ; 
06
F ; 
06
B ; 
06
0 ; B
01; F 01; P 01)  q01 (06P ; 06F ; 06B ; 010 ; B01; F 01; P 01)
5 = q
01
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06
P ; 
06
F ; 
06
B ; 
01
0 ; B
01; F 01; P 01)  q01 (06P ; 06F ; 01B ; 010 ; B01; F 01; P 01)
6 = q
01
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06
P ; 
06
F ; 
01
B ; 
01
0 ; B
01; F 01; P 01)  q01 (06P ; 01F ; 01B ; 010 ; B01; F 01; P 01)
7 = q
01
 (
06
P ; 
01
F ; 
01
B ; 
01
0 ; B
01; F 01; P 01)  q01 (01P ; 01F ; 01B ; 010 ; B01; F 01; P 01)
Figures 13 to 15 display the corresponding results. Overall, they are qualitatively in line with those
presented in section 5. For male workers, changes in personal coecients now play a larger role in
explaining higher wages above the median, as well as in explaining the increase in overall wage dispersion,
compared to the results discussed in section 5. Changes in rm coecients now contribute less to the
decline of wages below the median. Changes in rm characteristics are no longer statistically dierent
from zero, whereas they had slightly contributed to higher wages above the median before. Changes in
the bargaining premia, the bargaining regime, the personal characteristics, and the residual component
aect the wage distribution in a similar way as before.
Female workers prot slightly more above and slightly less below the median from changes in personal
coecients. These changes thus contribute to some degree more to the observed increase in overall wage
inequality. Below the median, changes in the bargaining specic remuneration are now negative and
slightly signicant. On the contrary, shifts in the bargaining regime reduce wages considerably less; for
most parts below the upper quartile, this eect is not signicantly dierent from zero anymore. Changes
in rm characteristics, which we argue are likely to present industry shifts, no longer work towards
decreasing wages at the bottom of the distribution. In a small region around the upper quartile, these
shifts become slightly negative. For workers below the median, shifts in personal characteristics are still
positive, but to a smaller extent, and mostly this eect is no longer statistically signicant. Changes
in the residual component and changes in rm coecients are very similar to the former decomposition
presented above.
Changes in the gender wage gap can be described as the dierence of changes in the gender spe-
cic wage distributions. Changes in personal and rm coecients, as well as the residual component,
contribute to changes in the gender wage gap in a similar way as before. Changes in bargaining specic
remuneration schemes are relatively more negative for female workers when applying the alternative order
of our decomposition, but are still not signicant. Changes in bargaining coverage become statistically
signicant and counteract an increase of the gender wage gap. On the contrary, changes in rm charac-
teristics now signicantly contribute to a rising gender wage gap, uniformly along the wage distribution.
Finally, females gain relativel to men below the lower quartile due to changes in personal characteristics.
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Figure 1: Log-wages of males and females and development of gender wage gap
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Figure 2: Unconditional log-wages and gender wage gap: Without collective bargaining
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Figure 3: Unconditional log wages and gender wage gap: Sectoral agreements
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Figure 4: Unconditional log-wages and gender wage gap: Firm agreements
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Figure 5: Overall gender wage gap
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Figure 6: Sequential decomposition of change in male wage distribution
Unconditional di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Figure 7: Sequential decomposition of change in female wage distribution
Unconditional di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Figure 8: Sequential decomposition of overall gender wage gap
Unconditional di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Figure 9: Sum of rm and bargaining eects
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Figure 10: Further decomposition of rm coecients eect
Males Females
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Figure 11: Further decomposition of rm coecients eect for gender wage gap
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Figure 12: Employment shares and coverage by sector
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Figure 13: Sequential decomposition of change in male wage distribution: Reversed order
Unconditional dierence
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Figure 14: Sequential decomposition of change in female wage distribution: Reversed
order
Unconditional dierence
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Figure 15: Sequential decomposition of overall gender wage gap: Reversed order
Unconditional dierence
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C Tables
Table 2: Real log wage distributions and gender dierentials, selected quantiles
2001 2006  2006-2001 GWG  GWG
Overall
 Male Female Male Female Male Female 2001 2006
10% 2.41 2.18 2.33 2.12 -0.08 -0.06 0.23 0.21 -0.02
25% 2.58 2.39 2.54 2.35 -0.04 -0.04 0.19 0.19 0.00
50% 2.79 2.61 2.80 2.60 0.01 -0.01 0.18 0.20 0.02
75% 3.05 2.85 3.08 2.88 0.03 0.02 0.20 0.21 0.01
90% 3.33 3.08 3.37 3.12 0.03 0.04 0.25 0.24 -0.00
No Collective Bargaining
Male Female Male Female Male Female
10% 2.28 2.08 2.25 2.07 -0.03 -0.01 0.20 0.18 -0.02
25% 2.45 2.25 2.44 2.27 -0.01 0.02 0.20 0.17 -0.03
50% 2.65 2.48 2.67 2.50 0.02 0.02 0.17 0.17 0.00
75% 2.94 2.76 2.99 2.79 0.05 0.03 0.18 0.20 0.02
90% 3.27 3.03 3.32 3.07 0.05 0.04 0.24 0.25 0.01
Sectoral Bargaining
Male Female Male Female Male Female
10% 2.49 2.27 2.43 2.22 -0.06 -0.05 0.22 0.21 -0.01
25% 2.64 2.45 2.63 2.46 -0.01 0.01 0.19 0.17 -0.02
50% 2.83 2.65 2.87 2.69 0.04 0.04 0.18 0.18 0.00
75% 3.08 2.89 3.11 2.93 0.03 0.04 0.19 0.18 -0.01
90% 3.34 3.09 3.38 3.15 0.04 0.06 0.25 0.23 -0.02
Firm Bargaining
Male Female Male Female Male Female
10% 2.50 2.30 2.50 2.15 0.00 -0.15 0.20 0.35 0.15
25% 2.65 2.48 2.70 2.42 0.05 -0.06 0.17 0.28 0.11
50% 2.85 2.66 2.99 2.73 0.14 0.07 0.19 0.26 0.07
75% 3.12 2.90 3.25 3.02 0.13 0.12 0.22 0.23 0.01
90% 3.38 3.14 3.48 3.26 0.10 0.12 0.24 0.24 0.00
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Table 3: Sequential decomposition at selected quantiles
Males
10 (s.e.) 50 (s.e.) 90 (s.e.)
Overall 2006-2001 -0.088 (0.006) 0.010 (0.011) 0.043 (0.009)
Personal Coecients -0.000 (0.007) 0.011 (0.008) 0.017 (0.010)
Firm Coecients -0.036 (0.007) 0.011 (0.005) 0.021 (0.004)
Bargaining Coecients -0.018 (0.007) -0.013 (0.006) 0.002 (0.007)
Firm and Bargaining Coecients -0.054 (0.003) -0.002 (0.004) 0.023 (0.006)
Residual -0.018 (0.007) -0.005 (0.008) 0.008 (0.009)
Bargaining Regime -0.016 (0.002) -0.010 (0.002) 0.005 (0.003)
Firm Characteristics -0.006 (0.004) 0.013 (0.007) 0.013 (0.005)
Personal Characteristics 0.006 (0.004) 0.003 (0.004) -0.023 (0.006)
Firm Characteristics and -0.022 (0.004) 0.003 (0.007) 0.018 (0.007)
Bargaining Regime
Females
10 (s.e.) 50 (s.e.) 90 (s.e.)
Overall 2006-2001 -0.068 (0.007) -0.008 (0.007) 0.046 (0.009)
Personal Coecients -0.035 (0.009) -0.014 (0.009) 0.006 (0.012)
Firm Coecients -0.032 (0.009) 0.001 (0.004) 0.009 (0.005)
Bargaining Coecients -0.006 (0.008) -0.002 (0.006) 0.013 (0.009)
Firm and Bargaining Coecients -0.038 (0.006) -0.002 (0.005) 0.022 (0.008)
Residual -0.004 (0.008) 0.008 (0.009) 0.021 (0.012)
Bargaining Regime -0.021 (0.002) -0.010 (0.002) 0.004 (0.003)
Firm Characteristics -0.023 (0.006) -0.003 (0.006) -0.005 (0.009)
Personal Characteristics 0.053 (0.006) 0.013 (0.005) -0.003 (0.007)
Firm Characteristics and -0.044 (0.006) -0.014 (0.006) -0.001 (0.009)
Bargaining Regime
Males
90-10 (s.e.) 90-50 (s.e.) 50-10 (s.e.)
Overall 2006-2001 0.131 (0.011) 0.034 (0.011) 0.098 (0.008)
Personal Coecients 0.018 (0.008) 0.007 (0.006) 0.011 (0.004)
Firm Coecients 0.057 (0.006) 0.010 (0.004) 0.048 (0.005)
Bargaining Coecients 0.020 (0.005) 0.015 (0.003) 0.005 (0.003)
Firm and Bargaining Coecients 0.077 (0.006) 0.025 (0.004) 0.052 (0.004)
Residual 0.026 (0.006) 0.013 (0.004) 0.013 (0.004)
Bargaining Regime 0.021 (0.003) 0.015 (0.002) 0.006 (0.002)
Firm Characteristics 0.019 (0.005) 0.000 (0.005) 0.019 (0.004)
Personal Characteristics -0.029 (0.005) -0.026 (0.005) -0.003 (0.003)
Firm Characteristics and 0.040 (0.005) 0.015 (0.005) 0.025 (0.004)
Bargaining Regime
Females
90-10 (s.e.) 90-50 (s.e.) 50-10 (s.e.)
Overall 2006-2001 0.113 (0.010) 0.054 (0.007) 0.060 (0.006)
Personal Coecients 0.041 (0.008) 0.020 (0.006) 0.021 (0.007)
Firm Coecients 0.041 (0.008) 0.008 (0.004) 0.033 (0.007)
Bargaining Coecients 0.019 (0.009) 0.016 (0.003) 0.003 (0.006)
Firm and Bargaining Coecients 0.060 (0.009) 0.024 (0.004) 0.037 (0.006)
Residual 0.025 (0.009) 0.014 (0.004) 0.012 (0.005)
Bargaining Regime 0.025 (0.003) 0.014 (0.002) 0.010 (0.002)
Firm Characteristics 0.017 (0.008) -0.002 (0.005) 0.019 (0.004)
Personal Characteristics -0.056 (0.007) -0.016 (0.005) -0.040 (0.005)
Firm Characteristics and 0.042 (0.009) 0.012 (0.005) 0.030 (0.005)
Bargaining Regime
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Table 4: Denition of Variables
Label Description
Individual level
Age Age in years
Tenure Tenure in years
Low education Low level of education: no training beyond a school degree
Medium education Intermediate Level of education: vocational training
High education High level of education: university or university of applied sciences
Education n/a Missing information on the education level
Extra shifts Individual worked night shifts, overtime, on Sundays or on holidays
Firm level
Schleswig-Holstein, HH Firm is located in Schleswig Holstein or Hamburg
Lower Saxony, Bremen Firm is located in Lower Saxony or Bremen
NRW Firm is located in North Rhine-Westphalia
Hesse Firm is located in Hesse
RLP, Saarland Firm is located in Rhineland-Palatinate or Saarland
Baden-Wurttemberg Firm is located in Baden-Wurttemberg
Bavaria Firm is located in Bavaria
10 - 99 employees Firm has between 10 and 99 employees
100 - 199 employees Firm has between 100 and 199 employees
200 - 999 employees Firm has between 200 and 999 employees
1000 - 1999 employees Firm has between 1000 and 1999 employees
2000 - 9999 employees Firm has between 2000 and 9999 employees
Mainly publicly owned Firm is mainly public-owned (>50%)
Share male employees Share of male employees
Share not fulltime Share of employees who do not work full-time
Mining, quarrying Mining and quarrying
Manufact: Food Manufacture of food products, beverages and tobacco
Manufact: Textiles Manufacture of textile and textile products, leather and leather products
Manufact: Wood Manufacture of wood and wood products
Publishing, printing Publishing, printing and reproduction of recorded media
Manufact: Coke, chemicals Manufacture of coke, rened petroleum products and nuclear fuel; chemicals and chemical products
Manufact: Rubber, plastic Manufacture of rubber and plastic products
Manufact: Non-metallic Manufacture of other non-metallic mineral products
Manufact: Metals Manufacture of basic metals; fabricated metal products, except from machinery and equipment
Manufact: Machinery Manufacture of machinery and equipment
Manufact: Electr. machinery Manufacture of electrical machinery and apparatus
Manufact: Electr. equipment Manufacture of electrical & optical equipment; radio, TV, & communication equipment & apparatus
Manufact: Instruments Manufacture of medical, precision and optical instruments, watches and clocks
Manufact: Transport Manufacture of transport equipment
Manufact: n.e.c. Manufacture not elsewhere classied
Electricity, gas, water Electricity, gas and water supply
Construction Construction
Auto sales, repair Sale, maintenance and repair of motor vehicles and motorcycles; retail sale of automotive fuel
Wholesale trade Wholesale trade and commission trade except of motor vehicles and motorcycles
Retail trade Retail trade, except from motor vehicles and motorcycles; repair of personal and household goods
Hotels, restaurants Hotels and restaurants
Transport Land, water and air transport
Auxiliary transport Supporting and auxiliary transport activities; activities of travel agencies
Post, telecommunications Post and telecommunications
Finance, insurance Financial intermediation, insurance and pension funding, except compulsory social security
Real estate Real estate activities; renting of machinery and equipment without operator
Data processing Data processing and information systems
Research, other services Research and development and other services
As further controls we include: Age squared, tenure squared, and the interactions of age with education.
Table 5: Descriptive statistics
Label Males Females
2001 2006 2001 2006
Mean Stdd. Mean Stdd. Mean Stdd. Mean Stdd.
Individual level
Age 39.63 (8.00) 40.62 (7.98) 38.94 (8.48) 39.65 (8.67)
Tenure 10.14 (9.18) 10.63 (9.13) 8.63 (8.38) 9.04 (8.24)
Low education 0.142 (0.349) 0.121 (0.326) 0.185 (0.388) 0.150 (0.357)
Medium education 0.681 (0.466) 0.654 (0.476) 0.667 (0.471) 0.642 (0.479)
High education 0.111 (0.314) 0.123 (0.329) 0.066 (0.248) 0.084 (0.278)
Education n/a 0.066 (0.249) 0.102 (0.302) 0.082 (0.274) 0.124 (0.330)
Extra shifts 0.275 (0.446) 0.281 (0.449) 0.142 (0.349) 0.149 (0.356)
Firm level
Schleswig-Holstein, HH 0.055 (0.228) 0.060 (0.237) 0.068 (0.251) 0.073 (0.260)
Lower Saxony, Bremen 0.115 (0.319) 0.114 (0.318) 0.099 (0.299) 0.104 (0.305)
NRW 0.295 (0.456) 0.275 (0.447) 0.276 (0.447) 0.262 (0.440)
Hesse 0.094 (0.292) 0.100 (0.300) 0.106 (0.307) 0.118 (0.323)
RLP, Saarland 0.068 (0.252) 0.064 (0.244) 0.062 (0.241) 0.057 (0.232)
Baden-Wurttemberg 0.188 (0.391) 0.187 (0.390) 0.200 (0.400) 0.184 (0.388)
Bavaria 0.185 (0.388) 0.201 (0.401) 0.190 (0.392) 0.202 (0.401)
10 - 99 employees 0.342 (0.194) 0.336 (0.472) 0.344 (0.475) 0.341 (0.474)
100 - 199 employees 0.129 (0.335) 0.134 (0.340) 0.140 (0.347) 0.142 (0.349)
200 - 999 employees 0.267 (0.442) 0.270 (0.444) 0.281 (0.449) 0.301 (0.459)
1000 - 1999 employees 0.070 (0.256) 0.081 (0.272) 0.075 (0.264) 0.083 (0.276)
2000 - 9999 employees 0.192 (0.394) 0.180 (0.384) 0.159 (0.366) 0.133 (0.339)
Mainly publicly owned 0.039 (0.194) 0.035 (0.185) 0.043 (0.203) 0.052 (0.221)
Share male employees 0.759 (0.187) 0.755 (0.185) 0.524 (0.233) 0.518 (0.233)
Share not fulltime 0.095 (0.121) 0.126 (0.129) 0.165 (0.179) 0.202 (0.183)
Mining, quarrying 0.012 (0.107) 0.009 (0.094) 0.002 (0.044) 0.001 (0.035)
Manufact: Food 0.031 (0.175) 0.028 (0.164) 0.056 (0.231) 0.054 (0.225)
Manufact: Textiles 0.009 (0.093) 0.007 (0.083) 0.026 (0.159) 0.018 (0.133)
Manufact: Wood 0.023 (0.149) 0.018 (0.133) 0.012 (0.110) 0.011 (0.104)
Publishing, printing 0.020 (0.140) 0.015 (0.122) 0.031 (0.173) 0.023 (0.150)
Manufact: Coke, chemicals 0.040 (0.197) 0.033 (0.178) 0.037 (0.189) 0.033 (0.177)
Manufact: Rubber, plastic 0.031 (0.174) 0.028 (0.164) 0.026 (0.159) 0.022 (0.146)
Manufact: Non-metallic 0.021 (0.142) 0.015 (0.122) 0.010 (0.098) 0.009 (0.095)
Manufact: Metals 0.084 (0.278) 0.074 (0.261) 0.040 (0.197) 0.033 (0.178)
Manufact: Machinery 0.092 (0.290) 0.100 (0.300) 0.046 (0.208) 0.047 (0.212)
Manufact: Electr. machinery 0.032 (0.175) 0.030 (0.171) 0.034 (0.182) 0.029 (0.167)
Manufact: Electr. equipment 0.018 (0.133) 0.012 (0.109) 0.021 (0.142) 0.013 (0.113)
Manufact: Instruments 0.018 (0.134) 0.019 (0.135) 0.024 (0.154) 0.022 (0.145)
Manufact: Transport 0.084 (0.277) 0.100 (0.300) 0.030 (0.169) 0.032 (0.175)
Manufact: n.e.c. 0.019 (0.137) 0.015 (0.120) 0.016 (0.125) 0.012 (0.110)
Electricity, gas, water 0.020 (0.139) 0.021 (0.144) 0.010 (0.010) 0.011 (0.104)
Construction 0.088 (0.283) 0.066 (0.249) 0.019 (0.137) 0.013 (0.112)
Auto sales, repair 0.029 (0.167) 0.032 (0.176) 0.015 (0.121) 0.016 (0.127)
Wholesale trade 0.074 (0.262) 0.077 (0.266) 0.081 (0.274) 0.090 (0.286)
Retail trade 0.038 (0.191) 0.035 (0.185) 0.114 (0.318) 0.118 (0.323)
Hotels, restaurants 0.011 (0.103) 0.011 (0.105) 0.031 (0.172) 0.033 (0.179)
Transport 0.025 (0.155) 0.032 (0.176) 0.011 (0.105) 0.015 (0.120)
Auxiliary transport 0.026 (0.160) 0.035 (0.185) 0.026 (0.158) 0.033 (0.179)
Post, telecommunications 0.014 (0.118) 0.011 (0.104) 0.020 (0.142) 0.020 (0.141)
Finance, insurance 0.056 (0.231) 0.046 (0.208) 0.128 (0.334) 0.103 (0.304)
Real estate 0.008 (0.087) 0.009 (0.093) 0.013 (0.113) 0.016 (0.124)
Data processing 0.018 (0.132) 0.025 (0.157) 0.017 (0.128) 0.020 (0.141)
Research, other services 0.060 (0.237) 0.098 (0.298) 0.104 (0.305) 0.153 (0.360)
No. of observations 332,403 547,243 108,346 199,018
All statistics are weighted by the inverse sampling probability.
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Table 6: Descriptive statistics: males
Label No collective agreement Sectoral Bargaining Firm Bargaining
2001 2006 2001 2006 2001 2006
Mean Stdd. Mean Stdd. Mean Stdd. Mean Stdd. Mean Stdd. Mean Stdd.
Individual level
Age 38.73 (7.91) 39.95 (7.99) 40.02 (8.01) 41.17 (7.97) 39.81 (8.06) 41.22 (7.77)
Tenure 6.53 (7.27) 8.14 (7.88) 11.54 (9.44) 12.51 (9.60) 11.99 (9.66) 13.96 (9.31)
Low education 0.138 (0.344) 0.117 (0.322) 0.144 (0.351) 0.130 (0.336) 0.140 (0.347) 0.087 (0.282)
Medium education 0.623 (0.485) 0.599 (0.490) 0.702 (0.457) 0.700 (0.458) 0.714 (0.452) 0.700 (0.458)
High education 0.110 (0.313) 0.115 (0.319) 0.111 (0.315) 0.125 (0.331) 0.113 (0.316) 0.162 (0.369)
Education n/a 0.129 (0.335) 0.168 (0.374) 0.042 (0.201) 0.045 (0.208) 0.034 (0.180) 0.051 (0.220)
Extra shifts 0.157 (0.363) 0.205 (0.404) 0.307 (0.461) 0.327 (0.469) 0.440 (0.496) 0.450 (0.498)
Firm level
Schleswig-Holstein, HH 0.078 (0.268) 0.066 (0.248) 0.045 (0.208) 0.052 (0.223) 0.046 (0.209) 0.067 (0.250)
Lower Saxony, Bremen 0.098 (0.297) 0.095 (0.294) 0.107 (0.309) 0.107 (0.309) 0.242 (0.429) 0.268 (0.443)
NRW 0.263 (0.440) 0.280 (0.449) 0.319 (0.466) 0.287 (0.452) 0.218 (0.413) 0.168 (0.373)
Hesse 0.106 (0.308) 0.104 (0.306) 0.089 (0.284) 0.094 (0.293) 0.091 (0.287) 0.108 (0.311)
RLP, Saarland 0.065 (0.247) 0.056 (0.230) 0.072 (0.259) 0.075 (0.263) 0.054 (0.225) 0.036 (0.187)
Baden-Wurttemberg 0.213 (0.410) 0.203 (0.402) 0.185 (0.388) 0.187 (0.390) 0.127 (0.332) 0.090 (0.286)
Bavaria 0.176 (0.381) 0.195 (0.396) 0.183 (0.387) 0.197 (0.398) 0.224 (0.417) 0.262 (0.440)
10 - 99 employees 0.637 (0.481) 0.514 (0.500) 0.237 (0.425) 0.201 (0.401) 0.120 (0.325) 0.097 (0.296)
100 - 199 employees 0.145 (0.352) 0.154 (0.361) 0.130 (0.337) 0.124 (0.330) 0.062 (0.241) 0.066 (0.248)
200 - 999 employees 0.171 (0.377) 0.222 (0.415) 0.310 (0.463) 0.317 (0.465) 0.266 (0.442) 0.269 (0.444)
1000 - 1999 employees 0.024 (0.154) 0.037 (0.188) 0.089 (0.285) 0.121 (0.326) 0.085 (0.278) 0.096 (0.294)
2000 - 9999 employees 0.023 (0.149) 0.073 (0.260) 0.233 (0.423) 0.237 (0.425) 0.467 (0.499) 0.472 (0.499)
Mainly publicly owned 0.004 (0.062) 0.010 (0.100) 0.040 (0.196) 0.051 (0.220) 0.154 (0.361) 0.091 (0.287)
Share male employees 0.653 (0.260) 0.732 (0.194) 0.769 (0.183) 0.772 (0.178) 0.767 (0.182) 0.786 (0.163)
Share not fulltime 0.117 (0.139) 0.141 (0.147) 0.084 (0.111) 0.111 (0.110) 0.100 (0.118) 0.126 (0.108)
Mining, quarrying 0.002 (0.046) 0.005 (0.067) 0.016 (0.126) 0.012 (0.107) 0.010 (0.099) 0.018 (0.134)
Manufact: Food 0.036 (0.187) 0.037 (0.189) 0.029 (0.167) 0.018 (0.132) 0.036 (0.185) 0.033 (0.179)
Manufact: Textiles 0.007 (0.081) 0.008 (0.087) 0.010 (0.101) 0.006 (0.080) 0.004 (0.066) 0.005 (0.072)
Manufact: Wood 0.024 (0.153) 0.020 (0.140) 0.023 (0.151) 0.017 (0.130) 0.013 (0.115) 0.010 (0.100)
Publishing, printing 0.020 (0.139) 0.016 (0.127) 0.022 (0.146) 0.016 (0.124) 0.006 (0.077) 0.005 (0.068)
Manufact: Coke, chemicals 0.014 (0.119) 0.012 (0.108) 0.056 (0.230) 0.055 (0.228) 0.012 (0.110) 0.019 (0.138)
Manufact: Rubber, plastic 0.036 (0.188) 0.034 (0.182) 0.029 (0.166) 0.023 (0.149) 0.034 (0.182) 0.018 (0.132)
Manufact: Non-metallic 0.012 (0.108) 0.017 (0.128) 0.023 (0.150) 0.015 (0.122) 0.032 (0.176) 0.007 (0.082)
Manufact: Metals 0.089 (0.285) 0.081 (0.273) 0.085 (0.279) 0.074 (0.262) 0.059 (0.236) 0.025 (0.155)
Manufact: Machinery 0.084 (0.277) 0.076 (0.266) 0.105 (0.306) 0.135 (0.341) 0.027 (0.163) 0.021 (0.144)
Manufact: Electr. machinery 0.023 (0.151) 0.026 (0.160) 0.035 (0.184) 0.036 (0.186) 0.033 (0.180) 0.018 (0.131)
Manufact: Electr. equipment 0.013 (0.113) 0.014 (0.119) 0.019 (0.136) 0.011 (0.104) 0.029 (0.167) 0.006 (0.074)
Manufact: Instruments 0.024 (0.154) 0.020 (0.141) 0.017 (0.129) 0.019 (0.136) 0.008 (0.089) 0.006 (0.078)
Manufact: Transport 0.018 (0.132) 0.040 (0.195) 0.098 (0.298) 0.123 (0.328) 0.202 (0.402) 0.323 (0.467)
Manufact: n.e.c. 0.020 (0.141) 0.018 (0.133) 0.020 (0.139) 0.013 (0.112) 0.010 (0.101) 0.007 (0.081)
Electricity, gas, water 0.002 (0.046) 0.004 (0.066) 0.027 (0.163) 0.030 (0.170) 0.024 (0.152) 0.068 (0.252)
Construction 0.092 (0.290) 0.071 (0.257) 0.097 (0.296) 0.071 (0.257) 0.004 (0.066) 0.006 (0.075)
Auto sales, repair 0.031 (0.174) 0.038 (0.191) 0.031 (0.173) 0.030 (0.172) 0.005 (0.070) 0.003 (0.055)
Wholesale trade 0.129 (0.335) 0.116 (0.320) 0.052 (0.223) 0.046 (0.210) 0.047 (0.212) 0.029 (0.168)
Retail trade 0.047 (0.211) 0.048 (0.214) 0.035 (0.184) 0.023 (0.151) 0.028 (0.165) 0.033 (0.178)
Hotels, restaurants 0.015 (0.122) 0.013 (0.114) 0.008 (0.091) 0.010 (0.098) 0.014 (0.116) 0.008 (0.091)
Transport 0.026 (0.158) 0.037 (0.188) 0.018 (0.135) 0.018 (0.132) 0.068 (0.252) 0.089 (0.285)
Auxiliary transport 0.032 (0.177) 0.050 (0.218) 0.022 (0.147) 0.021 (0.144) 0.038 (0.191) 0.036 (0.186)
Post, telecommunications 0.001 (0.039) 0.009 (0.094) 0.004 (0.060) 0.003 (0.052) 0.140 (0.347) 0.075 (0.364)
Finance, insurance 0.017 (0.128) 0.018 (0.135) 0.081 (0.273) 0.077 (0.267) 0.007 (0.082) 0.012 (0.108)
Real estate 0.010 (0.101) 0.011 (0.104) 0.005 (0.072) 0.007 (0.083) 0.016 (0.125) 0.007 (0.084)
Data processing 0.042 (0.201) 0.042 (0.201) 0.005 (0.073) 0.007 (0.082) 0.027 (0.162) 0.038 (0.192)
Research, other services 0.131 (0.338) 0.117 (0.321) 0.027 (0.161) 0.084 (0.277) 0.065 (0.247) 0.077 (0.266)
No. of observations 95,337 248,712 201,586 245,062 35,480 53,469
All statistics are weighted by the inverse sampling probability.
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Table 7: Descriptive statistics: females
Label No collective agreement Sectoral Bargaining Firm Bargaining
2001 2006 2001 2006 2001 2006
Mean Stdd. Mean Stdd. Mean Stdd. Mean Stdd. Mean Stdd. Mean Stdd.
Individual level
Age 38.46 (8.42) 39.29 (8.64) 39.26 (8.51) 39.97 (8.72) 38.52 (8.39) 40.46 (8.35)
Tenure 5.93 (6.81) 7.32 (7.08) 10.03 (8.81) 10.80 (9.08) 9.34 (8.32) 11.63 (8.28)
Low education 0.162 (0.369) 0.134 (0.341) 0.198 (0.399) 0.172 (0.378) 0.178 (0.383) 0.133 (0.339)
Medium education 0.630 (0.483) 0.605 (0.489) 0.685 (0.465) 0.685 (0.464) 0.694 (0.461) 0.668 (0.471)
High education 0.070 (0.255) 0.080 (0.272) 0.064 (0.245) 0.084 (0.278) 0.063 (0.243) 0.114 (0.318)
Education n/a 0.138 (0.345) 0.180 (0.384) 0.053 (0.224) 0.059 (0.235) 0.064 (0.245) 0.085 (0.279)
Extra shifts 0.093 (0.292) 0.121 (0.326) 0.146 (0.353) 0.160 (0.366) 0.312 (0.464) 0.308 (0.462)
Firm level
Schleswig-Holstein, HH 0.087 (0.282) 0.075 (0.264) 0.059 (0.236) 0.069 (0.254) 0.053 (0.224) 0.076 (0.265)
Lower Saxony, Bremen 0.083 (0.277) 0.096 (0.295) 0.099 (0.299) 0.100 (0.300) 0.167 (0.373) 0.184 (0.388)
NRW 0.242 (0.429) 0.270 (0.444) 0.303 (0.460) 0.264 (0.441) 0.216 (0.412) 0.192 (0.394)
Hesse 0.123 (0.329) 0.120 (0.326) 0.095 (0.293) 0.109 (0.311) 0.112 (0.315) 0.158 (0.365)
RLP, Saarland 0.056 (0.231) 0.048 (0.214) 0.065 (0.246) 0.068 (0.252) 0.065 (0.247) 0.056 (0.230)
Baden-Wurttemberg 0.222 (0.415) 0.185 (0.388) 0.191 (0.393) 0.194 (0.395) 0.178 (0.382) 0.116 (0.321)
Bavaria 0.186 (0.389) 0.205 (0.404) 0.189 (0.391) 0.196 (0.397) 0.210 (0.407) 0.217 (0.412)
10 - 99 employees 0.589 (0.492) 0.480 (0.500) 0.235 (0.424) 0.199 (0.399) 0.143 (0.350) 0.135 (0.342)
100 - 199 employees 0.161 (0.368) 0.152 (0.359) 0.133 (0.339) 0.140 (0.347) 0.108 (0.310) 0.078 (0.268)
200 - 999 employees 0.198 (0.398) 0.247 (0.432) 0.331 (0.470) 0.363 (0.481) 0.246 (0.431) 0.332 (0.471)
1000 - 1999 employees 0.025 (0.157) 0.040 (0.197) 0.097 (0.296) 0.124 (0.329) 0.119 (0.324) 0.169 (0.375)
2000 - 9999 employees 0.026 (0.158) 0.080 (0.272) 0.204 (0.403) 0.175 (0.379) 0.384 (0.486) 0.285 (0.451)
Mainly publicly owned 0.005 (0.070) 0.011 (0.106) 0.044 (0.205) 0.065 (0.246) 0.202 (0.401) 0.242 (0.429)
Share male employees 0.490 (0.233) 0.480 (0.238) 0.540 (0.232) 0.557 (0.222) 0.538 (0.233) 0.579 (0.206)
Share not fulltime 0.176 (0.185) 0.217 (0.198) 0.161 (0.179) 0.187 (0.167) 0.158 (0.149) 0.170 (0.132)
Mining, quarrying 0.000 (0.021) 0.001 (0.030) 0.002 (0.050) 0.001 (0.036) 0.004 (0.062) 0.003 (0.055)
Manufact: Food 0.076 (0.264) 0.069 (0.253) 0.048 (0.213) 0.034 (0.180) 0.044 (0.205) 0.060 (0.237)
Manufact: Textiles 0.023 (0.149) 0.021 (0.144) 0.029 (0.167) 0.016 (0.124) 0.019 (0.136) 0.010 (0.099)
Manufact: Wood 0.012 (0.111) 0.011 (0.103) 0.013 (0.111) 0.011 (0.103) 0.008 (0.091) 0.013 (0.112)
Publishing, printing 0.035 (0.183) 0.022 (0.146) 0.031 (0.175) 0.027 (0.162) 0.011 (0.104) 0.008 (0.086)
Manufact: Coke, chemicals 0.025 (0.157) 0.017 (0.128) 0.046 (0.210) 0.054 (0.226) 0.014 (0.116) 0.021 (0.144)
Manufact: Rubber, plastic 0.033 (0.180) 0.025 (0.156) 0.021 (0.143) 0.019 (0.137) 0.035 (0.184) 0.016 (0.126)
Manufact: Non-metallic 0.007 (0.081) 0.009 (0.096) 0.010 (0.100) 0.010 (0.097) 0.019 (0.135) 0.007 (0.082)
Manufact: Metals 0.043 (0.203) 0.030 (0.172) 0.041 (0.199) 0.040 (0.196) 0.020 (0.139) 0.009 (0.094)
Manufact: Machinery 0.034 (0.180) 0.036 (0.187) 0.056 (0.230) 0.067 (0.249) 0.015 (0.122) 0.012 (0.108)
Manufact: Electr. machinery 0.029 (0.169) 0.025 (0.156) 0.038 (0.190) 0.037 (0.189) 0.032 (0.176) 0.007 (0.085)
Manufact: Electr. equipment 0.017 (0.129) 0.015 (0.123) 0.021 (0.142) 0.011 (0.104) 0.038 (0.192) 0.006 (0.075)
Manufact: Instruments 0.033 (0.179) 0.023 (0.149) 0.021 (0.142) 0.023 (0.149) 0.015 (0.121) 0.005 (0.073)
Manufact: Transport 0.007 (0.083) 0.015 (0.122) 0.037 (0.189) 0.041 (0.197) 0.068 (0.252) 0.106 (0.308)
Manufact: n.e.c. 0.019 (0.137) 0.015 (0.121) 0.015 (0.120) 0.010 (0.101) 0.011 (0.106) 0.005 (0.070)
Electricity, gas, water 0.002 (0.042) 0.002 (0.043) 0.014 (0.117) 0.019 (0.137) 0.016 (0.124) 0.032 (0.176)
Construction 0.020 (0.138) 0.012 (0.109) 0.021 (0.144) 0.015 (0.122) 0.001 (0.038) 0.002 (0.046)
Auto sales, repair 0.016 (0.124) 0.019 (0.135) 0.016 (0.125) 0.016 (0.125) 0.003 (0.053) 0.002 (0.040)
Wholesale trade 0.125 (0.331) 0.124 (0.330) 0.063 (0.244) 0.053 (0.224) 0.035 (0.183) 0.045 (0.207)
Retail trade 0.085 (0.279) 0.141 (0.348) 0.135 (0.342) 0.101 (0.301) 0.075 (0.264) 0.050 (0.218)
Hotels, restaurants 0.039 (0.194) 0.033 (0.178) 0.026 (0.160) 0.033 (0.179) 0.026 (0.158) 0.036 (0.185)
Transport 0.010 (0.101) 0.014 (0.116) 0.007 (0.084) 0.007 (0.082) 0.048 (0.215) 0.074 (0.261)
Auxiliary transport 0.026 (0.158) 0.038 (0.191) 0.021 (0.142) 0.020 (0.140) 0.066 (0.248) 0.081 (0.273)
Post, telecommunications 0.002 (0.050) 0.009 (0.093) 0.003 (0.052) 0.004 (0.070) 0.238 (0.426) 0.210 (0.407)
Finance, insurance 0.029 (0.167) 0.036 (0.185) 0.196 (0.397) 0.200 (0.400) 0.021 (0.142) 0.030 (0.170)
Real estate 0.018 (0.132) 0.017 (0.131) 0.009 (0.096) 0.013 (0.114) 0.019 (0.135) 0.016 (0.125)
Data processing 0.036 (0.185) 0.030 (0.172) 0.005 (0.068) 0.006 (0.078) 0.028 (0.164) 0.031 (0.173)
Research, other services 0.199 (0.399) 0.192 (0.394) 0.055 (0.227) 0.112 (0.316) 0.074 (0.262) 0.103 (0.304)
No. of observations 36,054 97,115 61,087 81,090 11,205 20,813
All statistics are weighted by the inverse sampling probability.
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